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ABSTRACT
These Guidelines have been produced to support the implementation of Article 7
of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, with some reference to Article
12.  They are addressed primarily to the decision-makers within fisheries
management authorities and other interest groups, including fishing companies,
fishers' organizations, concerned non-governmental organizations and others.
The Guidelines provide a background to the need for fisheries management and
an introduction to the activities encompassed by fisheries management.  They
introduce the major constraints experienced in fisheries and fisheries
management and some of the fundamental concepts related to these.  Biological,
environmental, technological, socio-cultural and economic constraints and
concepts are examined.
Information is fundamental to responsible fisheries management and these
Guidelines put emphasis on the range of data required for informed decision-
making and examine aspects of the collection and interpretation of these data. 
Data are discussed in terms of three suggested scales in fisheries management: 
fisheries policy and development planning, formulation of management plans and
implementation of management action.
The range of possible management actions is outlined.  This includes technical
measures, such as gear restrictions, and more direct approaches in the form of
direct catch limitation or effort limitation.  The problems associated with open
access fisheries are explained and comments made on the means to limit access
and obstacles which may be encountered in this process.
Finally, the Guidelines examine the management process.  This section covers the
process of agreeing on a management plan for a fishery, including the need for
consultation and, where appropriate, cooperative decision-making.  The need for
periodic review of management plans is stressed.  The importance of an effective
legal framework, institutional and administrative structures and monitoring
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1. From ancient times, fishing has been a major source of food for
humanity and a provider of employment and economic benefits to those engaged
in this activity.  However, with increased knowledge and the dynamic
development of fisheries, it was realized that living aquatic resources, although
renewable, are not infinite and need to be properly managed, if their contribution
to the nutritional, economic and social well-being of the growing world's
population was to be sustained.
2. The adoption in 1982 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea provided a new framework for the better management of marine
resources.  The new legal regime of the oceans gave coastal States rights and
responsibilities for the management and use of fishery resources within their
EEZs, which embrace some 90 percent of the world's marine fisheries.
3. In recent years, world fisheries have become a dynamically developing
sector of the food industry, and many States have striven to take advantage of
their new opportunities by investing in modern fishing fleets and processing
factories in response to growing international demand for fish and fishery
products.  It became clear, however, that many fisheries resources could not
sustain an often uncontrolled increase of exploitation.
4. Clear signs of over-exploitation of important fish stocks, modifications
of ecosystems, significant economic losses, and international conflicts on
management and fish trade threatened the long-term sustainability of fisheries
and the contribution of fisheries to food supply.  Therefore, the Nineteenth
Session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI), held in March 1991,
recommended that new approaches to fisheries management embracing
conservation and environmental, as well as social and economic, considerations
were urgently needed.  FAO was asked to develop the concept of responsible
fisheries and elaborate a Code of Conduct to foster its application.
5. Subsequently, the Government of Mexico, in collaboration with FAO,
organized an International Conference on Responsible Fishing in Cancún in May
1992.  The Declaration of Cancún endorsed at that Conference was brought to the
attention of the UNCED Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992, which
supported the preparation of a  Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.  The
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FAO Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing, held in September 1992,
further recommended the elaboration of a Code to address the issues regarding
high seas fisheries.6. The One Hundred and Second Session of the FAO
Council, held in November 1992, discussed the elaboration of the Code,
recommending that priority be given to high seas issues and requested that
proposals for the Code be presented to the 1993 session of the Committee on
Fisheries.
7. The Twentieth Session of COFI, held in March 1993, examined in
general the proposed framework and content for such a Code, including the
elaboration of guidelines, and endorsed a time frame for the further elaboration
of the Code.  It also requested FAO to prepare, on a "fast track" basis, as part of
the Code, proposals to prevent reflagging of fishing vessels which affect
conservation and management measures on the high seas.  This resulted in the
FAO Conference, at its Twenty-seventh Session in November 1993, adopting the
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, which, according to
FAO Conference Resolution 15/93, forms an integral part of the Code.
8. The Code was formulated so as to be interpreted and applied in conformity
with the relevant rules of international law, as reflected in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, as well as with the Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995, and in the light of,
inter alia, the 1992 Declaration of Cancún and the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, in particular Chapter 17 of Agenda 21.
9. The development of the Code was carried out by FAO in consultation
and collaboration with relevant United Nations Agencies and other international
organizations, including non-governmental organizations.
10. The Code of Conduct consists of five introductory articles:  Nature and
Scope; Objectives; Relationship with Other International Instruments;
Implementation, Monitoring and Updating and Special Requirements of Developing
Countries.  These introductory articles are followed by an article on General
Principles, which precedes the six thematic articles on Fisheries Management, Fishing
Operations, Aquaculture Development, Integration of Fisheries into Coastal Area
Management, Post-Harvest Practices and Trade, and Fisheries Research.  As already
mentioned, the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International
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Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas
forms an integral part of the Code.
11. The Code is voluntary.  However, certain parts of it are based on
relevant rules of international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982.  The Code also contains provisions
that may be or have already been given binding effect by means of other
obligatory legal instruments amongst the Parties, such as the Agreement to
Promote Compliance with Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing
Vessels on the High Seas, 1993.
12. The Twenty-eighth Session of the Conference in Resolution 4/95
adopted the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries on 31 October 1995. 
The same Resolution requested FAO inter alia to elaborate as appropriate
technical guidelines in support of the implementation of the Code in
collaboration with members and interested relevant organizations.
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO THE GUIDELINES
FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
These guidelines are addressed primarily to the decision-makers within fisheries
management authorities and interest groups, including fishing companies, fishers'
organizations, concerned non-governmental organizations (NGO) and others.
The formulation of guidelines in support of the implementation of Article 7 (Fisheries
Management) of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries has been a
demanding task, and one that can only be expected to provide an overall view of the
key issues concerned. In fact, beginning with the Expert Consultation on this subject
held in Auckland, New Zealand, 23-27 January 1995  (FAO Fish.Rep., 519), the
original draft annexed to that report has gone through a number of revisions,
reflecting inputs from a large number of experts in many different fields within FAO
and outside, as well as from intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.
The key problems faced by the Organization in preparing the guidelines and by
the experts who have provided input to this document fall into six main
categories:
1. The highly diverse approaches to fisheries management currently adopted
by States throughout the world involved in fisheries reflect their
traditions, infrastructure and ecological and geographical situation, and
their varied approaches to the question of individual rights to exploit
national resources.
   
2. Management guidelines must be truly interdisciplinary, and their
formulation requires agreement, not only on the technical details by local
experts on resources, economics, and sociology, but also on common
paradigms and objectives, before the details of a management system can
be formulated.  To a significant extent, this process must be accomplished
in the local context and cannot be provided in the form of a 'recipe'.
3. The guidelines must have something relevant to say at all levels of the
fishery process, from international commissions, national governments
and local communities to fishing enterprises and fishermen.
4. The Code is intended to be general, covering freshwater, coastal and
estuarine to high seas fisheries, and from small scale to sophisticated
commercial fisheries. Although there are some global themes which we
have
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tried to emphasize, a  number of the relevant considerations for specific
categories differ in each case.
5. A lack of confidence in some of the methods of fisheries management
currently more widely used has developed. This, in practical terms, stems
from the seriously depleted state of many  world fisheries that have used
these methods (see, for example, FAO Fish.Tech.Pap. 335, ‘Review of the
state of the world marine fishery resources’, and subsequent FAO fishery
reviews). This does not mean that the methodologies in question cannot
be effective in certain circumstances but does means that standard recipes
cannot be offered and should not be accepted without careful
consideration of their relevance in the local situation.
6 The current period is, in fact, one of considerable experimentation with
new approaches to fisheries management, including, inter alia, technical
measures, economic and social tools for ensuring inter-generational
equity, ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches, input and output control
mechanisms and management frameworks involving management in
partnership between the State and fishers or their communities. This
search for appropriate new approaches, without abandoning the traditional
measures where they have proved effective, is to be actively encouraged. 
Similarly, searches for more appropriate combinations of established
management tools may well be fruitful in many cases.  It is therefore to be
expected that, in future, further additions to, revisions of or commentaries
on these guidelines will be issued by FAO and others which emphasize
and elaborate in much more detail specific management approaches in
particular situations for specific resources.
All of these considerations make it impossible for this document to provide a
single prescription of optimal management in the case of a given fishery.
However, it is hoped that, in conjunction with the ‘Guidelines on the
precautionary approach to capture fisheries and species introductions’ (FAO
Fish.Tech.Pap., 350/1, reissued as FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible
Fisheries.  No.2.  Rome, FAO.  1996.  54p.), the 'Reference points for fisheries
management' (FAO Fish.Tech.Pap., 347) and the other guidelines for the Code
issued on ‘Integration of fisheries into coastal area management’ and on ‘Fishing
operations’ (both of which are being published in the same series as the present
one), these guidelines will help to focus an informed search for a management
framework appropriate to the particular circumstance being considered.
Moritaka Hayashi
Assistant Director-General (Fisheries Department)
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Need for Fisheries Management
Fisheries have substantial social and economic importance.  It is estimated that
12.5 million people are employed in activities related to fishing and the value of
fish traded internationally has been estimated at US$ 40 billion per annum for
the early nineties.  The total production from capture fisheries and aquaculture
during the same period reached and oscillated around a total mass of 100 million
tons.
However, at present, a large proportion of the world’s exploited fish stocks are
fully exploited, over-exploited, depleted or in need of recovery and many are
affected by environmental degradation, particularly in the inland and coastal
areas.  Major ecological damage, which may not always be reversible, and
economic waste are already evident in many cases.
New technological developments, such as geographical positioning systems (GPS),
radar, echo-sounders, more powerful vessels and improved processing methods (e.g.
surimi) continue to enhance the ability of fishers to exploit more living resources
more intensively, potentially increasing the severity of the problem.
The existing status of the world’s living aquatic resources is largely a result of a
failure of the present process of fisheries governance to achieve responsible and
effective management of fisheries in most countries.  Fishers, fisheries
management authorities and fisheries scientists, as well as those responsible for
indirect impacts such as environmental degradation, must accept shared
responsibility for the existing unsatisfactory status of the world’s fisheries and
living aquatic resources. It is the States’ responsibility to ensure that joint
measures are taken to reverse these trends.  What follows highlights the actions
necessary to implement responsible fisheries management.
It is important for fisheries managers to realize that, when resources are being over-
exploited or exploited in an irresponsible manner, a failure to act will have negative
consequences in the future.  Reducing fish stocks to biologically and ecologically
harmful levels will result in a loss of potential benefits as food, income, employment
and others, both immediately and in the long term.  A very low level of any stock is
likely to have negative impacts on other dependent stocks, and the losses may extend
beyond the immediately affected stock.  It cannot automatically be assumed that, in
such cases, a relaxation of fishing pressure will lead to a full or immediate recovery of
the stock and associated ecosystem.  In some cases losses may be long-lasting or even
permanent.
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1.2 The Fisheries Management Process
There are no clear and generally accepted definitions of fisheries management. 
A working definition, for the purposes of this document, may be taken as:
The integrated process of information gathering, analysis,
planning, consultation, decision-making, allocation of resources
and formulation and implementation, with enforcement as
necessary, of regulations or rules which govern fisheries activities
in order to ensure the continued productivity of the resources and
accomplishment of other fisheries objectives.
Fisheries management entails a complex and wide-embracing set of tasks, aimed
at ensuring that the optimal benefits are obtained for the local users, State or
region from the sustainable utilization of the living aquatic resources to which
they have access.  While fisheries management draws on fisheries research and
analysis and, sometimes, institutionalized processes of elaboration of advice, it
should not be confused with them; it encompasses but goes beyond them. From
the working definition above, fisheries management can be taken to include the
following:
(i) Setting policies and objectives for each fishery or stock to be managed,
taking into account the biological characteristics of the stock, the nature of
existing or potential fisheries and other activities related to or impacting
the stock and the potential economic and social contribution of the fishery
to national or local needs and goals.
(ii) Determining and implementing the actions necessary to enable the
management authorities, the fishers and other interest groups, to work towards
the identified objectives.  This task should be done in consultation with all
interest groups.  The actions required will include:  developing and
implementing management plans for all managed stocks; ensuring that the
stock or stocks, the ecosystems in which they occur and their environment are
maintained in a productive state; collecting and analyzing the biological and
fishery data necessary for assessment, monitoring, control and surveillance;
adoption and promulgation of appropriate and effective laws and regulations
necessary to achieve the objectives, and ensuring that fishers comply with
them to achieve the objectives.
(iii) Consulting and negotiating with users or interest groups concerned with
resources and from areas not directly related to fishery activities but which
impact on fisheries.   Examples would include groups engaged in activities in
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a river or lake basin or the coastal zone which impact on fisheries.  The
management authority needs to ensure that the interests of fisheries are
appropriately considered and catered for in planning and integration of
such activities.
(iv) In consultation with the users, regularly reviewing the management
objectives and measures to ensure they are still appropriate and effective.
(v) Reporting to Governments, users and the public on the state of resources
and management performance.
In the Code of Conduct the primary responsibility for overseeing the fisheries
management process is vested essentially with fisheries arrangements and
organizations. To be operational and allow for adequate governance, those
arrangements and organizations should be determined and integrated into
institutional support structures, i.e the fisheries management institutions.  In this
document, the fisheries management institutions have been arbitrarily aggregated
into two main categories:  the fisheries management authority and the interested
parties.
A fisheries management authority is defined very broadly in this document in
order to focus attention on the fisheries management process itself rather than
focusing attention on the otherwise important juridical distinctions between the
very wide range of bodies (both national and international) embraced by the term
as it is defined here.
A fisheries management authority accordingly is defined to include the legal
entity which has been assigned by a State or States with a mandate to perform
certain specified fisheries management functions. In national systems, including
federal systems, a fisheries management authority would usually take the form of
a ministry, a department within a ministry (e.g. agriculture) or an agency.  A
fisheries management authority may also be international in character and
include a fisheries management organization or arrangement either sub-regional,
regional or global.  No assumption is made in this definition as to whether the
body in question is governmental, parastatal or private.
The term interested party (or interest group) refers to any party which has been
accepted by the State or States or by the management authority on behalf of the
State or States as having a legitimate interest in the fisheries resources being
managed.
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1.3 Biological and Environmental Concepts and Constraints (7.1.1)
1.3.1 Resource constraints
(i) Living populations or stocks are capable of growth in abundance and
biomass, but only up to a certain limit.  The limits to growth are determined by
the current size of the population in relation to its average abundance in the
unexploited state, and by the environment in which the stock occurs.  The
maintenance of a stock at productive levels requires an adequate abundance of
reproductively mature adults, the spawners, and suitable critical environments for
successfully passing through the different stages in the life history.  However,
particularly as a result of variability in the environment, the growth of a stock
from year to year is usually highly variable.
(ii) The potential productivity of stocks is best understood through scientific
analysis, based on agreed concepts, using standard methodologies to produce
reproducible and comparable results.  However, where the capacity is not
available for this, for example in some traditional coastal communities, some
estimates may be obtainable from empirical observation on historical catch
levels.  Determining the existing status of a stock, and the potential yield from it
under different management strategies, is the goal of modern stock assessment.
The most reliable stock assessments available should underlie fisheries
management decisions on the resources and hence the returns from the resource
through utilisation (see Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4).
(iii) Responsible fishing should not allow more of the resource to be harvested
on average than can be replaced by net growth in the stock.  This does not mean
that annual catches may never exceed net annual production and, under most
harvesting strategies, natural variability and uncertainties are such that catches
are likely to exceed production in some years.  However, such action should not
result in the biomass of the stock or stocks falling below the pre-determined limit
reference point (see Section 3.1) at which the risk of resource collapse becomes
unacceptably high.  Failure to follow this rule will mean that the resource will be
depleted with time, leading to lower than optimal average yields and economic
returns.  If steps are not taken to correct such a situation, the risk of biological
collapse, of uncertain duration, and economic waste or extinction of the fishery
will be increased to an unacceptable level (7.2.1).
(iv) Fish species occur in populations which may be made up of a number of
largely self-sustaining stocks, which are effectively genetically isolated from each
other by behavioural, oceanographic or topographical features.  As far as possible,
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fisheries management must address each stock separately and strive to fish each stock
sustainably (7.3.1) or set an overall exploitation rate that does not drive the
components of a multi-species resource to dangerously low levels.  Failure to adhere
to this will result in a risk that there will be extinctions or severe depletions of
individual stocks, even while the population as a whole is in an apparently healthy
state.  The effective genetic isolation of stocks could mean that such local extinctions
are irreversible, and permanent damage is done to the status and productivity of the
population as a whole as well as to local fishing grounds.
(v) In addition to avoiding over-fishing of specific stocks, the fisheries
management authority needs to avoid actions that will adversely affect the
genetic diversity of a stock or population.  Long-term fishing pressure above
sustainable levels on selected portions of a stock, such as large individuals, can
have the effect of reducing the frequency of the selected genetic features, hence
reducing the heterozygosity of the stock or population.  Such sustained selective
effects should be avoided.
(vi) While many fisheries, and many stock assessment and management
strategies, focus on single-species or stocks, in reality all species of aquatic
resources function within, and are dependent on, communities of differing
complexity in terms of the number of species.  Therefore, harvesting any one
species is almost certain to impact others, either through technological
interactions such as the incidental capture of other species during fishing, or
through food chain effects such as reducing the abundance of a predator, prey or
competitor of other species through fishing.  The impact on ecological linkages
(e.g. through the trophic chain) between species, may lead to changes in species
dominance and affect the dynamic equilibria of the resource system, potentially
affecting future options. These multi-species effects need to be considered in
responsible fishing, which should aim to ensure that no species, whether
targeted, by-catch or indirectly affected by fishing, is reduced to below
sustainable levels by fishing (7.6.9).
(vii) An important consequence of multi-species effects in fishing is that it is
impossible to harvest simultaneously the maximum sustainable yield from each
species in an assemblage in a given area comprising a mixture of predators and prey
species.  Each element of the assemblage has its own biological parameters and
characteristics and would require a specific fishing regime catching only that species,
a condition impossible to fulfil in practice.  In addition, modifying the abundance of
predators (or prey species) will affect the abundance of the other elements of the
assemblage with which they interact in a way which remains generally difficult to
forecast. As a consequence, the optimal multi-species yield from an area will always
be lower than the sum of the individual species potential yield.  Responsible fishing
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should therefore not aim to obtain the maximum sustainable yield from each
component of a multi-species community as this will lead to over-exploitation of
at least some of the component stocks (7.2.3).
1.3.2 Environmental constraints
(i) The life stages of fish are affected by environmental conditions, which
can influence growth, reproductive and mortality rates.  The earlier life stages are
particularly susceptible to such influences which can lead to high variability in
resource abundance and production on a variety of time-scales.  Of most
relevance to fisheries management are fluctuations in recruitment from year to
year and shifts in ecological regime in which the functional characteristics of the
ecosystem, including the composition, abundance and location of the fish
community, may change dramatically over periods of decades, driven by
environmental forces.  Fisheries management must be aware of this variability
and, particularly for inter-annual variability, attempt to address it in management
plans (7.2.3).  This requires that fisheries must be able to cope, without adding
excessive adverse impact on the stock, with years in which the stock and its
productivity are driven to below-average levels by natural environmental
fluctuations.  Thus, the capacity of the fisheries (i.e. the potential effort which
they can exert) must not be determined by and set on the basis of yields which
can be obtained in average to good years but on the long-term average, with
flexibility to allow for effort reductions in bad years.  Failure to address this
principle in the case of variable resources will lead to continual pressure to over-
exploit the fisheries in below average years and to an overall poor economic
performance of the fisheries.
(ii) Environmental variability can also influence the availability of fish to the
fishery by, for example, dispersing fish more widely so that they are less
available or concentrating them in areas where they are more easily caught.  Care
must be taken that such changes in availability are not interpreted as changes in
stock size, which can lead to incorrect management decisions being made and to
excessive and unsustainable catches.
(iii) In most unperturbed ecosystems, an unfished stock will tend to fluctuate
around an average maximum level, corresponding to the average carrying capacity of
the habitat for that stock.  The long-term productivity of a stock is related to this
carrying capacity.  However, the carrying capacity not only can change through time
due to natural variability but also decline as a result of human activity such as
destructive fishing methods (e.g. the use of dynamite or cyanide), coastal habitat
degradation (e.g. through urban development or destructive trawling in sensitive
habitats), modification of river flows, or pollution.  This may adversely affect the
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productivity of stocks, contributing to the risk of over-exploitation.  Fisheries
management should assess the impact of such influences on the status of fish
stocks and their natural habitats and take steps to correct the situation by (i)
acting to stop any adverse environmental impacts resulting from human activity
(7.2.2f) and g); 7.2.3), (ii) adjusting the fishing pressure to take into account
changes in productivity and, if necessary, (iii) restore stocks and habitats to a
productive condition (7.6.10).
(iv) Alternatively, habitat enhancement can positively influence the
productivity of fish stocks through, for example, ecologically sound provision of
artificial reefs, appropriate levels of fertilization of lakes, control of predators,
restoration of destroyed or damaged coastal, shore-line or river-bank habitat
areas, or through improvements in water quality.  Attention should be given to
maintaining, or restoring as necessary, nursery habitats and migratory pathways,
including important longshore and offshore/onshore pathways.
(v) Inland fisheries are particularly influenced by external environmental
factors, and responsible use of inland fisheries requires the identification of the
primary external factors influencing these fisheries and their impacts on the fish
stock or stocks.  Such knowledge is required to ensure that appropriate
management action can be taken when changes are brought about by one or more
of these factors.  Such action may include appropriate adjustment of fishing
mortality but may also include corrective or rehabilitative action. The most
common external factors influencing inland fisheries production include:
water quantity, both the absolute (e.g. mean) quantity and the distribution of
the quantity over time (e.g. seasonal, longer-term cycles, artificial regulation),
and
water quality, which will most commonly change through pollution by toxic
chemicals, excessive sediment load or eutrophication.
1.3.3 Biodiversity and ecological considerations
(i) Fishing activities are normally deliberately targeted at one or more species
in an ecosystem.  However, they frequently also affect other components of the
ecosystem through, for example, by-catch of other species, physical damage to
the ecosystem or through food chain effects.  Responsible fisheries management
should consider the impact of fisheries on the ecosystem as a whole, including its
biodiversity, and should strive for sustainable use of whole ecosystems and
biological communities (7.2.2d)).
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(ii) As mentioned in 1.1, many fish stocks around the world are already over-
exploited and depleted.  This results in lower yields being obtained from the
stocks than would otherwise be possible (or lowered quality and economic value
of the landings), and increases the risk of stock collapse and negative ecological
changes.  Fisheries management is required by the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention (and by the Code of Conduct) to restore depleted populations
(7.6.10) to levels above those at which maximum productivity occurs (e.g. to
biomass levels higher than the level corresponding to the Maximum Sustainable
Yield, MSY).  This reflects current thinking that providing a margin for safety
that takes into account normal variability and uncertainty requires using MSY as
a limit for fisheries management, rather than as a target.
1.4 Technological Considerations
(i) In managing an unstocked, capture fishery, the only mechanism available
to maintain the fish stock at a desirable level and with an age structure adequate
to avoid recruitment over-fishing, is the control of fishing mortality, i.e. the
proportions of the various age groups of the stock which are removed in a given
period, usually defined as one year, by the fishery.  By regulating the amount of
fishing effort exerted, either through catch or effort controls, by regulating the
gear or fishing method used and by regulating when and where fishing is
permitted, the management authority can control the mass and sizes or ages of
fish caught, within the limits of natural variability and uncertainty.  This is
discussed further in 3.1.
(ii) It is widely recognized that the presence of excess capacity in a fishery
increases the pressure on the fisheries management authority to exceed the
optimal fishing mortality on a stock, and makes it more difficult to enforce
regulations restricting effort.  This occurs through social and political pressures
to make full use of this excess catching and processing capacity and to retain
those people associated with this excess capacity in employment.  However, this
will clearly only be a short-term solution leading to even greater problems in the
long-term.  Excess capacity also inevitably involves economic inefficiency. It is
therefore in the interests of the users and the resource to maintain potential
fishing capacity at a level commensurate with the long-term stock productivity. 
Mechanisms to do this are discussed under 3.1 (7.1.8; 7.2.2a); 7.6.1; 7.6.3).
(iii) Fisheries management authorities must recognise that fishers continually strive
to improve the technology they use as well as their cost-effectiveness. This, however,
tends to improve their efficiency in fishing.  In a fishery regulated by effort control,
this can mean that actual effort and hence fishing mortality is, in reality, slowly
increasing as fishers discover new ways to become more efficient
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even though nominal effort (e.g. number of fishing days) is controlled.  This
phenomenon must be catered for both in control of fishing, where effort control
is used as a management tool, and in interpreting effort statistics for stock
assessment purposes.  Technological progress implies that, in order to maintain
fishing capacity and mortality at desired levels, continuous adjustments to meet
allowed effort levels may be needed.
1.5 Social and Economic Dimensions
(i) From one perspective, human involvement in fisheries can be seen as
having an overwhelming and possibly irreversible impact on the resource. 
Alternatively, fisheries resources can be viewed as capital stock that if managed
responsibly can generate considerable and sustained social and economic
benefits.  The social and economic dimensions consider the effect of the fishery
on people and how to optimize the benefits for the interested parties or interested
groups and the society in general. Included in the interest groups are the people
who use technology to exploit fisheries resources:  to catch and produce fish; to
process it in various ways; and to market it or otherwise derive a livelihood from
fish.  To these interested parties can be added the consumers, lobby groups and
other groups which may be indirectly affected by management decisions. 
Recreational fisheries have considerable social and economic importance in
many countries and representative bodies from this sector should be included as
interest groups in such cases.
(ii) Responsible fisheries require that the critical factors constituting the social
and economic dimensions of the management system be understood (7.4.5).  The
social dimension encompasses a wide range of variables in the human sphere.  It
is primarily concerned with the interaction between people:  how, and why,
individuals or groups behave in relation to each other and in relation to the
fisheries resource they use or on which they depend.  These relations are
mediated by a great variety of cultural patterns, habits and customs, instruments
of exchange, institutions and individual or group motivations.  Further, fisheries
are primarily economic activities and the economic dimension encompasses
revenues and costs which vary with the level of exploitation and relate to
dynamic market forces.
(iii) Social and economic variables interact closely, and any management decision
is likely to have effects on, for example, the distribution of income and wealth, the
amount and form of employment, the allocation of use rights, the composition and the
cohesion of interest groups and sub-groups.  More generally, interest group attitudes,
positive and negative, towards management regimes will be influenced by
management decisions and actions.  Fisheries management actions may further affect
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the contribution of the fishery to critical policy issues such as food security, net
foreign exchange earnings, subsidies and other benefits and costs.
(iv) Alternatively, social and economic dimensions can conflict, in which case
care must be taken to seek the greatest coincidence between the agreed social and
economic objectives of any management plan.  Failure to reach a minimum
agreed level of compatibility will directly affect the acceptability and
implementability of any management plan.  The ease with which coincidence is
likely to be reached is related to the simplicity of the fishery.  For example,
coincidence would tend to be more easily reached in pure industrial fisheries,
particularly in international fisheries, in which the economic dimension usually
predominates. On the contrary, social considerations frequently dominate in
small-scale fisheries. Such social considerations can include, for example, the 
transmission of knowledge, recruitment of crew, investment and credit schemes,
solidarity, channels of reciprocal obligations and rights linking individuals of
different social status. These factors are in turn often dependent on age, gender,
family history, local beliefs and customs. Moreover, in small-scale fisheries,
contacts between user groups, political leaders and administrations tend to rely
mainly on social processes and institutions. When considering subsistence, small
scale and artisanal fisheries, particular attention should therefore be paid to the
social conditions, and the specific perceptions, of the participants (7.2.2c)).  The
greatest problems in achieving coincidence in the objectives are likely to occur in
mixed (technology and species) fisheries with mixed social, economic and
biological objectives.
1.5.1 Social and cultural constraints
(i) Social conditions are subject to constant changes over time and space.
Changes can operate on several levels: longer-term cycles of historical change,
shorter-term cycles of seasonal change and the immediate month-to-month or
day-to-day changes which might be related to weather, employment, demand and
supply and other conditions.  Such changes will impact the management
approach in an interactive manner as people will be affected by the management
regime but, in turn, their attitudes to it, and hence its viability, will be influenced
by the prevailing state of a range of these dynamic social conditions.  Even in
traditional societies, where the pace of change may seem slow, these elements in
the social system and the historical patterns of resource exploitation must be
taken into consideration (7.6.6). 
(ii) Some social variables are to a degree quantifiable and hence can be measured
and subjected to quantitative analysis and modelling.  Other variables, however, relate
to meaning, values and organization in the social life of the interest groups.
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These can be difficult to identify and even more difficult to quantify, often
because they are the result of combinations of dynamic elements such as the
culture in which people live and its historical development.  Examples of such
qualitative variables include:  motivation of individuals; fishing behaviour,
strategies and perceptions of risk; status and political influence in a group or
community; perception of moral legitimacy of management practices; and access
to information.  Knowledge of both qualitative and quantitative variables is the
basis for evaluating the compatibility between a management option and the
social context in which it has to function (7.6.7).
(iii) A first step towards identifying the relevant variables of the social
dimension is the identification and selection of those distinct social groups who
are concerned with the resource, its use and the benefits which derive from it, i.e
the social groups making up the different interested parties.  A second step is to
analyse how these groups interact and to evaluate how different management
interventions may affect each of them.  The social groupings will usually vary
depending on the type of production unit. In different circumstances,
professional skill, kinship ties, age or ethnic group may all play a role in
determining the composition of the production unit and the social and economic
relations between members of the unit.  Such considerations should not be
overlooked if the management system is to be accepted.
1.5.2 Economic context and constraints
(i) A paramount objective for the fishery sector as a whole is to realize its full
economic potential, as measured over time by the sum of net economic benefits
across all producers and consumers, including rent which could be otherwise
extracted.
(ii) Under optimum conditions market forces usually ensure economic
efficiency.  However, optimum conditions generally do not prevail in the fishery
sector and there is a need to address carefully the impact, inter alia, of
externalities and price distortions which might lead to economic overfishing. 
These are frequently major sources of economic inefficiency, which generally
result in rent dissipation and would require management intervention.
(iii) Without proper management mechanisms, fishers tend to have insufficient
incentives and information to take into account the effects their activities have on
others in the short and long term.  This produces a pervasive tendency for over-
expansion of fishing effort beyond the point of maximum economic yield.  Economic
overfishing manifests itself in excessive input allocation to the fishery, inducing,
particularly in industrial fisheries, over-capitalization and frequently excess fishing
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capacity as stocks are progressively depleted.  Eventually, in most fisheries a
point will be reached where the cost of fishing exceeds the value of the catch. In
addition, this typically occurs in a context where fluctuations in fish abundance,
market prices and operating costs are continuous and induces cycles of
investment and stock depletion.  States should therefore strive to prevent or,
where necessary, eliminate excess fishing capacity, thereby maintaining fishing
effort at levels appropriate to the productivity of the resource or resources (7.1.8;
7.6.3).
(iv)  Price distortions may also contribute to over-investment and economic waste
and often exacerbate management constraints.  Among these are the many subsidies
which States provide to the sector in relation to investments or to some key inputs
such as fuel and various form of tax exemptions and rebates (see Section 3.2.1).
(v) Externalities are common to the fishery sector.  These relate in particular
to internal externalities linked to the nature of the stocks and their exploitation. 
They may be imposed by a user of the resource on another user or group of
users, for example, when large efficient vessels fish in the same areas as small-
scale fishers, resulting in negative interactions between the two sub-sectors or
when mobile gear interacts with fixed bottom gear (7.6.5).  These externalities
may result in substantial shifts in fishing behaviour and strategies of interest
groups.  They may induce conflicts and costs which can be significant and could
lead to lower economic performance.
(vi)  The economic performance of fisheries is strongly influenced by the
broad economic context.  Failure to integrate macroeconomic factors and account
for externalities generated from outside the fishery sector is likely to undermine
the foundation of fisheries management interventions and again encourage
conflicts. Fisheries must be influenced for example by the evolution of exchange
rates, trade regulations and changes in fiscal policies.  Moreover, and particularly
at local level, the fishery sector often competes with other sectors, frequently for
resource use but also in relation to other externalities such as the impact on
fisheries of environmental degradation by other sectors.
(vii) Conflicts between different users for the use of the same aquatic resources are
common (e.g between tourism and fishing in coastal areas or between fishing and
agriculture in use of inland waters), and an important task of the relevant authorities is
to evaluate current and potential conflicts with a view to minimizing them and
obtaining optimal returns from the resource. Inter-sectoral and inter-institutional
dialogue is therefore inevitably required and should be sustained, for example,
between the fisheries management authority and the finance and planning ministries
or within appropriate international fora.  Such dialogue and information
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exchange will enable the fisheries sector to take advantage of, or make
appropriate adjustments to, exogenous policy and economic changes. It will
facilitate developing coherent and consistent options or proposals to guide the
fishery towards participating in achieving the goals determined by macro-
economic policies, local development strategies or the evolution of the
international context.
(viii) Many existing fisheries management concepts are based on cases where a
single State has complete jurisdiction over a fishery. In the case of transboundary
fisheries, States tend to act like competing harvesters, each of which is induced
to neglect the impact of its own harvesting on the stock and on future
productivity.  Such activity has the probable consequence of driving the stock
and fisheries, on both sides of the boundaries, into the spiral of over-
capitalization discussed above.  Unless the countries concerned reach a binding
agreement or, failing that, nevertheless cooperate (7.1.5) to conserve and manage
the fishery jointly, the economic performances of each and all participating
States are unlikely to be maximized.
(ix) However, poor economic performances, as well as management failures,
are frequently directly linked to the complexity of most fisheries (unavoidable
by-catches and discards, uncertainty and imperfect information, incomplete and
multiple jurisdictions, irreconcilable conflicting objectives).  These constraints
are often exacerbated by an inability or unwillingness to implement and support
the costs of management measures that reduce externalities.  Hence, evaluation
of economic performances must not oversimplify fluctuations in the economic
parameters of the fishery.  This is particularly valid for multi-species fisheries in
which the various species are likely to interact.
(x) The evaluation of economic performances requires an assessment of all
costs and all benefits, direct and indirect (see Section 2.3.3), associated with a
fishery or a specific sub-sector, related to the users and to the management
authority and generated from inside or outside the sector.  Each stage of the
management process involves transaction costs such as for gathering
information, coordinating participants, resolving conflicts, monitoring conditions
and enforcing decisions.  The transaction costs of management are likely to vary
according to the extent of user participation in the management process (see
Section 3.3) and they should also be evaluated.
(xi)  In international fisheries, measurement of costs and benefits may include
unique considerations.  For example, there may be specific costs and benefits
associated with the cooperative action required for international management of the
fishery.  Economic constraints to transboundary management might be, for example,
19-  -
if some non-contracting parties to a cooperative arrangement find it beneficial to
avoid management and compliance costs of the agreed management strategy and
plan (e.g. costs of carrying observers, of modifying gear and enforcement costs).
 Such non-compliance could also impose external costs on all contracting parties,
such as  reduced global catch for the contracting parties leading to displacement
of vessels with possible loss of net revenues.  Another difficulty with
international fisheries is the probable existence of different national interests and
objectives possibly leading to conflicts.  These differences could include
discount rate, production costs, consumer preferences and prices of fish on the
national markets.
(xii)   Responsible fisheries management requires an assessment of the economic
consequences of any management action (7.6.7).  A primary requirement is to
estimate the value of the fishery and incorporate consideration of this value into
the various options for the allocation of the resource and the extraction of its rent.
 The net value to society of a fishery is any returns earned in excess of the
opportunity costs of the labour and capital employed.  Rent can be obtained by
the State or local authority either through taxation (on catch or effort) or by
charging users for use of the resource.  An alternative might be to leave rents
with the industry in such a way that their value could be capitalized into property
rights.  Whatever the management option retained, the extraction of reasonable
rent will usually require limiting usage.
(xiii)  In determining the value of a fishery or exploited resource, key issues that need
to be considered are the definitions of the management unit and the production units
within it (see Section 2.3.3).  The definitions must be wide enough to include all
economic factors that impact on the fishery. Otherwise, control of one sector (e.g. the
commercial sector) may unintentionally transfer benefits to or from another sector (e.g
the recreational sector).  Further, it needs to be recognized that regulating only a part
of the fishing activity on a resource or area, for example the industrial fishery sector,
may exert an economic bias on, for example, the artisanal sector, with unexpected
consequences preventing achievement of the objectives for the fishery as a whole. 
Therefore, management units should, as far as possible, consider all interacting
fisheries and related activities.
1.6 Institutional Concepts and Functions
(i) Fisheries management institutions, as defined in Section 1.2, must be
consistent with the requirements of responsible fisheries management.  They should
be tailored to the characteristics of particular fisheries and individual nations and, as
far as possible, be designed to match the expectations and perceptions of resource
users.
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(ii) In a broader sense, the institutions may comprise the various sets of
relations between individuals or groups of interested parties and the State or
States which define their respective rights and responsibilities.  These may
include rules (e.g. designation of the management regime), mechanisms (e.g.
decision-making process) and the organizational support structures that develop
and implement the rules affecting the use of the fishery resources. Such support
structures may include, for example, a fishery administration, intergovernmental
management body, gathering of village elders or committee of users.
(iii) In this document, fisheries management arrangements or organizations are
addressed principally through two main categories of institutions:  the fisheries
management authority and the interested parties.  The management authority will
be the legal entity which has been designated by a State or States to make the
decisions on how the fishery must be carried out and to implement the decisions.
 It is taken to be accountable for ancillary services, such as resource allocation,
consultation with interested parties or determination of the conditions of access
to the fishery. The term interested party (or interest group) will generally refer to
any party which has been accepted by the State or States or by the management
authority on behalf of the State or States, as having a legitimate interest in the
fisheries resources being managed.
(iv) In the case of international fisheries, representatives of the States
concerned are likely to be the interested parties and must take responsibility for
the interests of their citizens, some of who may themselves be members of
interest groups within or between States, such as fisher organizations or non-
governmental organizations (7.1.6).  In the case of fisheries within national
jurisdiction, States must decide within the fishery and its direct and indirect
segments who should be among the interested parties (7.1.2). In both cases,
States should recognize that representatives of States or groups which can show a
legitimate interest and commitment to long-term management objectives can also
be admitted as interested parties (7.1.4).
1.6.1 Institutional context and characteristics
(i) Management institutions may differ widely in nature and serve a wide range of
functions, including, as is often the case with traditional institutions, functions besides
the management of fisheries.  Different institutions will differ in terms of their rules,
mechanisms and structures and the manner in which they are assembled. The
effectiveness of a fisheries management institution is highly dependent upon the
appropriateness of its separate components and the way in which these components
interact.  The cause of ineffective management often lies with institutional deficiencies
expressed both in terms of functions and assemblage.  In addition, the
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perception of the legitimacy of the institutions will affect the extent to which those
institutions will be efficient in carrying out their management responsibilities.
(ii) The groups of interested parties should preferably have conditions for
membership satisfying specific standards in fisheries management (e.g.
production, market, resource conservation, environmental protection, etc.). 
When based on clearly defined interests or common factors, such as geographical
areas, ports, community, gear or resource type, these groups may be more
effective and ultimately result in better management performances than if they
are poorly defined and heterogeneous in composition.  In the fisheries
management process, these institutions, or the decision-making mechanisms
associated with them, will be the principal point of contact between the
individuals constituting the groups of interested parties and the fisheries
management authority responsible for developing plans.
(iii) Final responsibility for decision-making usually lies with the relevant political
authority.  However, responsible fisheries management requires that institutional
partnerships enabling various types of collaboration with the interested parties be
recognized as possible alternatives to locating the entire set of management
responsibilities with pure government structures or arrangements (7.1.2).
(iv) Institutional designs for ensuring the collaboration of interested parties in
the fisheries management process may range from:  setting informational
mechanisms aimed essentially at presenting the outputs of the management
planning process; through establishing consultative mechanisms designed mainly
for the responsible government structure to gather information and receive
guidance from interested parties; to establishing specifics sets of mechanisms for
sharing management responsibilities with various degrees of delegation of
competencies (see Section 3.3).
(v) When feasible, mechanisms should be considered to ensure that the
interested parties provide for the cost of operation of the fisheries management
authority at a level adequate for it to discharge its functions.
(vi) Institutions are dynamic by nature and need to be permanently monitored,
evaluated and adjusted as necessary to ensure ongoing effectiveness and legitimacy. 
Institutional adjustment is a complex and sometimes uncertain endeavour.  For
example, the adoption of institutional arrangements that facilitate economic efficiency
may encounter obstacles such as cultural values, inertia within producer organizations
or political sensitivity to the consequences of change.  To tailor management
institutions to the state and nature of particular fisheries, care should  be taken to adopt
approaches that are flexible and which explicitly allow for regular
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re-negotiation of management measures.  States should also review the
performance of their management authorities and those international ones of
which they are members at intervals normally of every three to five years.
1.6.2 Role and function of fisheries management institutions
(i) A primary function of a fisheries management institution is typically to
identify and implement rules and procedures whereby the fishery can be carried
out in a sustainable fashion to meet established objectives.  Usually these rules
mainly translate policy objectives into rights and obligations, supported as
necessary by policy instruments.  For example, they may determine the nature
and extent of users’ entitlements or define the conditions of access to a fishery
and may be supported by a fiscal scheme to extract rent.  Whatever their nature
(e.g. formal or informal), identified rules should be embodied by the State or
States in the legal regime in force (see Section 4.3.1) or sanctioned at policy
level.
(ii) Responsible fisheries management requires the existence of management
institutions among which would be one or more explicit fisheries management
authority.  In particular, functions of any management authority at a minimum
should include the mandate for:
identifying the interested parties and overseeing the formulation of the
management objectives;
translating, in cooperation with the interested parties, these objectives into
management plans and defining the criteria upon which decisions and
regulatory measures will be based, evaluated and adjusted as necessary;
ensuring implementation of the management measures through monitoring
control and surveillance;
coordinating the collection and analysis of information and data necessary to
allow responsible fisheries management (see Sections 2.2 to 2.4); and
liaising and negotiating on behalf of the fisheries interests with users of other
resources or areas having an impact on fisheries.
The area of competence and the fish resources, fisheries and geographical areas
for which the fisheries management authority is responsible and accountable
must be precisely defined.
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(iii) A fisheries management authority may incorporate sub-structures or
subsidiary bodies as required to perform various functions, or it may be
constituted of several separate autonomous but interrelated bodies.  The presence
and number of subsidiary bodies and the nature of the linkages between them
will vary substantially depending on factors such as the political, geographical or
fishery context and the nature of the authority or mandate assigned.  However,
when relevant, levels of responsibility among subsidiary bodies should be clearly
specified. Regardless of the structure chosen, care must be taken to ensure that
efficient channels of communication, interaction and feedback exist between the
various components of the management authority, with the interested parties and
with any other institutions indirectly concerned with the fishery.
(iv) When States devolve all or part of management functions to local
government or groupings, such as management committees, producers'
organizations or fishing communities, this delegation of authority must also
include clarification of their respective functions and, where relevant,
delimitation of the geographical area or management unit falling under each
jurisdiction.  For fisheries managed at local level, care should be particularly
taken to establish unequivocal arrangements on the nature and allocation of
access rights, the consultation process, the mechanisms for the collection and
analysis of data and information and the structure for compliance and
enforcement (see Section 3.3).
(v) General institutional frameworks for transboundary stocks and high-sea
fisheries are set out in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and, in the
case of high-sea fisheries, are further detailed in the 1995 UN Convention on
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Stocks.  They are also suggested in
Agenda 21 adopted by the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED).  More generally, the nature of responsibilities, mode of
operation and structure of international or regional fisheries management
arrangements or institutions dealing with marine or inland fisheries should not
differ substantially from national fisheries management institutions.  The primary
differences usually relate to the international nature of the arrangement or
institution, frequently resulting in additional complexity.  In particular, the States
or management authorities concerned must reach a balance between national and
common interests and must overcome the generally limited enforcement capacity
of intergovernmental institutions.
(vi) If the area of jurisdiction of the management authority, as constituted, only
covers part of the stock area or, in such cases where the area of responsibility of a
fisheries management authority overlaps with the areas of responsibility of one or
more other fisheries management authorities, mechanisms for cooperation or specific
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bilateral, sub-regional or regional institutional arrangements or organizations should
be set up (7.1.3). An integral part of such cooperation must include the collection of
relevant biological, social, economic and environmental data in a uniform and
accurate way throughout the range of the stock and the sharing of these data (7.3.4).
1.7 Time-scales in the Fisheries Management Process
It is important to recognize that fisheries management requires goals, research
and actions on a variety of time and political scales (from days to years and from
local to intergovernmental).  There is considerable overlap between activities at
the different scales and frequently the same individuals, groups and institutions
will be involved in processes and decisions related to more than one time- and
political-scale.  These different scales occur within a regional or broader context,
in the case of transboundary fisheries, or at a national or local level in the case of
stocks confined to a single EEZ or local area.
There are three primary activities, occurring at and involving different scales,
which should be explicitly considered by fisheries management authorities.
(i)Fisheries policy and development planning.  Fisheries and the optimal use of
living aquatic resources are frequently important within national or local
economies and also interact with other geographically contiguous social and
economic activities or compete for use of common resources such as coastal or
riverine habitat, water usage, etc.  This macro-policy and macro-economic
context requires that fisheries activities should take into account national
development planning strategies.  It is therefore important that policy and
planning decisions are made in full knowledge of the implications, costs, benefits
and alternatives for use of the resources.  These policy decisions will not include
the details of daily fisheries management activities, such as specific control
measures, but should provide the broad directions on how the resources are to be
utilised and the priorities to be given.  The policy or policies would normally
include the criteria by which access to resources is granted.  For example, the
fishery policy could stipulate whether preference in each fishery should be given
to small-scale traditional fishers or to large-scale industrial fisheries or to some
other arrangement.  The development and stipulation of policy is normally the
responsibility of government, advised by the management authority and other
relevant government departments.  Policy should be reviewed regularly (e.g.
every 5 years).
(ii) Management plan and strategy.  Fisheries policy will normally stipulate the
broad directions and priorities to be pursued in utilization of a nation’s living aquatic
resources. The policy, as it applies to any specific fishery or stock, needs to be
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translated into a detailed management plan for each fishery (7.3.3; see Section
4.1) which includes the stocks being considered, the agreed biological, social,
and economic objectives, the control measures and associated regulations, details
of monitoring, control and surveillance and other information specifying how the
fishery will be managed. The management plan and strategy should be
developed by the management authority with full input from the recognized
interest groups and should be evaluated and reviewed, including an “audit” of
performance, every three to five years.
(iii) Management implementation.  The management plan provides details on how
the fishery is to be managed and by whom.  It should include a management
procedure which gives details on how management decisions are to be made
according to developments within the fishery, particularly in response to changes in
resource status from year to year.  For example, the management plan may specify
management by a total allowable catch, and the management procedure would then
specify how the total allowable catch is to be calculated each year on, for example, the
basis of stock assessment using commercial catch and effort statistics and the results
of a fisheries-independent survey.  Management implementation involves the action
and decision-making necessary to ensure that the management plan is put into
operation and functions efficiently.  It therefore includes responsibilities such as
collecting the data necessary to make resource and fishery control decisions, for
example determining the annual total allowable catch (TAC) in accordance with the
management procedure, licensing of fishers, monitoring, control and surveillance, and
liaison with interest groups on the status of the fishery and resources in relation to the
management plan.  These are discussed further in Section 4.
1.8 Precautionary Approach
The Code of Conduct dedicates Article 7.5 to the precautionary approach to
capture fisheries and species introductions (FAO Fish.Tech.Pap., 350/1, reissued
as FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries.  No.2.  Rome, FAO. 
1996.  54p.).  The concept of the precautionary approach in the context of the
protection of the environment was enshrined in Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development which
states:
"In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities.  Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation."
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The implications of the precautionary approach to capture fisheries and species
introduction have been intensively examined in the Guidelines referred to
immediately above.  Section 1.6 of these Guidelines summarizes the implications
of the precautionary approach as follows.
“1.6 The precautionary approach involves the application of prudent foresight.
 Taking account of the uncertainties in fisheries systems and the need to take
action with incomplete knowledge, it requires inter alia:
a. consideration of the needs of future generations and avoidance of changes
that are not potentially reversible;
b. prior identification of undesirable outcomes and of measures that will
avoid them or correct them promptly;
c. that any necessary corrective measures are initiated without delay, and
that they should achieve their purpose promptly, on a time-scale not
exceeding two or three decades;
d. that where the likely impact of resource use is uncertain, priority should
be given to conserving the productive capacity of the resource;
e. that harvestable and processing capacity should be commensurate with
estimated sustainable levels of resource, and that increases in capacity should
be further contained when resource productivity is highly uncertain;
f. all fishing activities must have prior management authorization and be
subject to periodic review;
g. an established legal and institutional framework for fishery management
within which management plans that implement the above points are
instituted for each fishery; and
h. appropriate placement of the burden of proof by adhering to the
requirements above.”
2. MANAGEMENT DATA AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
AND USE
(i) The collection of data and information is not an end in itself but is
essential for informed decision-making.  It is therefore important for the
management authority to ensure that the data collected are analysed correctly,
disseminated to where they can best be used, and used appropriately in decision-
making. Information is also needed to assure the public at large that resources are
managed responsibly and that the objectives are being reached.
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(ii) It must be recognized that data and information are required at the three
levels, policy formulation, formulation of management plans, and the
determination of management actions to implement the policy and plans.  These
will overlap considerably and each of the three steps will be influenced by what
has happened or is happening at the other two levels.  Nevertheless, the three
processes are distinct, occur on different time scales and require different
information to different levels of detail.  Where necessary, differences in
methods and approaches between, e.g., artisanal and commercial fisheries and at
different time scales need to be emphasised.
2.1 General Considerations in the Collection and Provision of Data
and Information for Fisheries Management
(7.4.2; 7.4.4)
2.1.1 Data requirements for different management scales
(i) In general, as the locality and scope of decisions moves from management
implementation to management planning to policy formulation, the degree of
synthesis and aggregation of information required will increase.  At the level of
management implementation, details on the current biomass and the age structure and
distribution of a stock may be extremely important.  However, at the other end of the
spectrum, the policy-makers may need to focus mainly on the options for potential
annual yield, provided by technical experts, the fisheries' national socio-economic role
and their interactions with other macro-economic or macro-policy considerations. 
These distinctions are discussed in more detail in 2.2 to 2.4.
(ii) The management authority should be responsible for setting-up and
overseeing the structures and mechanisms for routine collection and analysis of
the necessary data.
2.1.2 Verification or validation of data
(i) Approaches to collecting data for fisheries management vary substantially,
depending on, for example, the nature of the fishery, the staff and facilities available,
and the social and economic importance of the fishery.  Whatever methods are used,
the quantity and quality of the data collected will have a direct influence on the quality
of the management which can be exercised, and so the most effective use must be
made of personnel and facilities available for data collection.
(ii) The verification or validation of data is essential to ensure that it is accurate,
complete and gives a true indication of the state or value of the factors under
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consideration.  The problems associated with the collection of fisheries data
mean that the risks of collecting erroneous or inappropriate data are very high
without careful and statistically valid design and monitoring of sampling
approaches.
(iii) Different types of data will need to be verified in different ways.  Some
examples of methods to validate data include:
checking logbooks against landings data (e.g. sales notes);
sampling catches for species composition;
comparing landings statistics with certificates of origin, trade and commodity
production statistics (e.g. processed fish) and similar sources of information;
inspecting data collection methods by statistical staff;
interviews with fishers;
observer schemes;
reporting from sea on retained catch on entering and leaving the fishing zones;
developing and implementing the use of vessel monitoring systems such as
transponders to monitor the position, catch and activities of vessels; and
instituting airborne and shipboard surveillance, associated with the boarding
of vessels.
(iv) Adequate training and supervision of staff involved in monitoring are
essential if the data collected are to be valid.  Staff involved in data collection are
frequently relatively junior in organizational hierarchies.  However, they are also
frequently expected to work in remote areas or as the sole observers aboard
ships, often with no contact with their supervisors or colleagues for lengthy
periods.  It is important that they are prepared for this with adequate training and
that every effort is made to maintain morale and an awareness of the role of their
task within the broader fisheries agency.  Regular site visits, incorporating
quality control, should be made by supervisory staff to data collection points and
regular in-service training sessions held.
2.1.3 Standardization of data collection (7.4.6)
(i) Many stocks, and possibly most marine stocks, are not found exclusively
within the areas of national jurisdiction of a single State but are distributed across
international boundaries.  As stated in 1.3.1, stocks must be managed as units or the
management  actions will almost certainly fail to achieve the desired objectives.
Where this requires cooperation between management authorities of different
countries, provinces or local agencies, the task of cooperative management is made
much easier and more effective if the different partners in the cooperative
management all collect data according to common definitions, classifications and
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methodologies and in a pre-agreed, standardized format, enabling all data to be
combined and compared as required.
(ii) Collection of data in a standardized manner will require that the
cooperating partners meet periodically to agree on the data requirements, the
methods to collect the data, the amount of data to be collected and to review the
sample design within each independent jurisdiction.  In addition, joint training of
staff involved in data collection will almost certainly be advantageous.
2.1.4 Timely distribution
(i) The prompt provision of data in time for appropriate decisions and action
to be taken is essential for effective fisheries management.  Regular and frequent,
typically annual, assessments of fisheries and resources, and a review of
appropriate management options in response to changes are essential, and these
can only be effective if they incorporate reliable and up-to-date data and
information.  With due regard for confidentiality requirements (see Section
2.1.5), management authorities should participate in and encourage sharing of
information and data amongst different agencies and interest groups with
genuine needs for these (7.4.6; 7.4.7).
(ii) Collection of appropriate and high quality data can be complex and costly
but, in view of the above, fisheries management authorities must ensure, through
the provision of adequate support, that the necessary data collection and analysis
systems exist and function effectively.
(iii) Particularly where distances between sampling points are great as, for
example, with highly migratory or straddling stocks, the potential role of data
transmission by radio, fax, Email and satellites or transponders installed on
commercial fishing vessels should be considered. 
2.1.5 Confidentiality of data (7.4.7)
(i) It is usually important to the fishing industry and to individual fishers to know
that aspects of the information which they supply to fisheries management authorities
are kept confidential, in particular that information or those data which could be used
by their commercial competitors to gain an advantage.  In view of this, fisheries
management authorities must implement policies and strategies which ensure
confidentiality of data falling into this category.  While aggregated catch data are
generally not regarded as being confidential, data relating to the fishing activity of
individual vessels or company specific catch rates, fishing localities and fishing
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strategies are frequently seen as being of potential interest to competitors and
therefore need to be kept confidential.
(ii) Fisheries management authorities need to liaise with all providers of data to
establish which data should be kept confidential.  Failure to do this could result in
future problems in obtaining data from companies, falsification of data or similar
problems related to or stemming from a lack of trust in the management authority.
(iii) Related to commercial confidentiality, it is usually desirable to ensure that
the data collection tasks and structures of a management authority are kept
totally separate from the enforcement tasks and structures.  Failure to do this will
generate a fear amongst fishers that the data they supply to the management
authority to facilitate monitoring and assessment of the stocks and fishery will be
used against them by the enforcement arm.  Again, this could lead to difficulties
obtaining data or to falsified or incomplete data.
2.1.6 Costs of collection and collation of data
(i) The collection, collation and dissemination of data should be carried out
in the most cost-effective manner possible so as to minimize costs while
acquiring the required information.  Collection and analysis systems should be
based on appropriate statistical designs to ensure that sufficient but only
necessary data are collected.
(ii) Duplication in data collection and analysis should be avoided unless
deliberately intended for validation purposes or for other reasons related to
maintaining quality. Unnecessary duplication is most likely to occur where there
are straddling or shared stocks with multiple authorities having common
responsibilities.
2.2 Data Requirements and Use in the Formulation of Fisheries
Policy
(i) The role of fisheries in the regional, national or local economy must be
understood before the best policy decisions can be made.  Therefore, there must
be a clear understanding of the position and status of fishing in the national
economic and social interest.
(ii) Fisheries usually generate benefits in terms of economic return, employment
and food production and in terms of recreational opportunities.  However, they also
generate costs to the community or State which may arise through meeting
management requirements, provision of facilities or subsidies, interference with or
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prevention of other activities in the same area and other causes.  Proper policy
decisions require up-to-date and accurate information on these factors.
(iii) A summary of the types of data required in the formulation of policy is
provided in Table 1.
2.2.1 Types of fisheries, the stocks they depend on and
their ecological and environmental context
(i) The structure of fisheries, both within areas of national jurisdiction and
beyond, may be complex, targeting on a range of species with different gears,
involving different scales of operation and different fishing zones and landing
sites.  Fisheries may range from a commercial focus to subsistence to
recreational.  At the level of policy-making, information on the potential
magnitude, possibly measured in terms of potential catch, economic value and
employment opportunities for each fishery or each stock should be provided. 
Failure to do this could result in policies which lead to unrealistic social or
economic expectations and hence encourage over-exploitation.
(ii) There is frequently interaction between fisheries for different resources in
an area, and, as mentioned in 1.3.1, fishery activities on one stock or biological
community may impact others.  Therefore, fisheries management authorities
need to advise policy-makers on the potential implications for other fisheries of
any changes in policy for a given fishery (7.2.3).
(iii) Fish stocks depend on their environment, and the nature of this
dependence may differ for different life-stages.  National policy decisions which
have implications for the environment of stocks important to fisheries, even if
the decisions do not directly involve fisheries, need to be made taking
cognizance of their implications for affected fisheries (7.2.3; 7.3.5; Fishing
operations.  FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries. No.1.  Rome,
FAO.  1996.  26p.).
(iv) Lessons can frequently be learnt from the successes and failures of the
past, and fisheries management authorities should provide policy-makers with
concise histories of the fisheries under consideration, with particular emphasis on
problems experienced, previous management strategies followed and their
consequences.
(v) The importance of integrated coastal area management (ICAM) and
specifically the integration of fisheries into coastal area management is now widely
recognized (Article 10 of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries; Integration
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of fisheries into coastal area management.  FAO Technical Guidelines for
Responsible Fisheries.  No.3.  Rome, FAO.  1996.  17p.).  These principles have
been developed with an awareness that many coastal areas are subject to open
access and frequently to multiple use.  The fact that many coastal areas are
suffering from increased population pressure exacerbates the problem.  Similar
problems of multiple use occur in inland waters, necessitating a similar concept
of integrated basin management. Fisheries management authorities should be
playing an active, and proactive, role in encouraging policy makers to develop
integrated policies and plans for the terrestrial and aquatic environments.
2.2.2 Fisheries characteristics
(i) Policy decisions on regional, national or local fisheries should be
formulated and made in the full knowledge of the nature of the fisheries under
consideration, including the different fishing groups or fleets and their
composition, as well as the fishing grounds they use or propose to use.
(ii) Fisheries policy should recognize the potential biological, technical,
social and economic interactions between fleets within a specific fishery and
between fisheries.  Policy should endeavour to minimize negative interactions
which could lead to conflict or to poor performance by one or more fishery.
(iii) Policy should take cognizance of the impact of fishing operations on the
environment and hence encourage practices which are sustainable and do not
result in avoidable damage (7.2.2f) and g); 7.6.9, and Fishing operations.  FAO
Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries.   No.1.  Rome, FAO.  1996. 
26p.)
2.2.3 Social and economic information
(i) Humans are an integral part of fisheries systems and fisheries systems
cannot be understood unless the social and cultural features and the economic
characteristics of the people and communities within the system are understood. 
Any fisheries management decision is likely to have an impact on peoples'
livelihoods and way of life and the purpose of collecting and analyzing social
and economic information is to be able to anticipate the nature and extent of
these impacts and to make decisions so as to optimize them.  Collection and
analysis of data on relevant social, economic and institutional factors is therefore
essential for responsible fisheries management (7.4.5).
(ii) At the level of policy, the decision-makers should have information on the
following:
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the interest groups, their features and their interests in the fishery;
the economic factors related to the fishery, particularly the economic and
social  dependence of the different interest groups on the fishery;
details on costs and benefits to the region, State or local area from the fishery;
the role of the fishery in providing employment to different interest groups;
the alternative sources of employment and income for the different interest
groups or communities;
the current status of access to or ownership of the resources;
the institutions currently involved in decision-making within the fishery;
an outline of the history of the fishery and the historical roles of the different
interest groups within that fishery.
(iii) The economic role and performance of fisheries is influenced by the
whole regional, national or local economy, and information on these influences
is required for wise and responsible policy development.  Hence information is
required on the main factors contributing to the broader economy, the main
factors driving or hindering development within this broader economy and the
influences or potential influences of any development on the fisheries sector.
(iv) Social, economic and even institutional characteristics are as dynamic as
biological features and tend to change with time.  It is therefore important to
monitor and provide information on trends in these factors, including on issues
such as demographic changes, movements of people, trends in the markets and
issues related to costs in order to assist in the development of policies which will
not rapidly become obsolete.
(v) Fisheries are frequently marked by conflicts between different sectors or
within sectors, and an important role of policy is frequently to determine a
fisheries environment in which conflict or the potential for conflict is minimized.
 Information is therefore required on historical and existing conflicts and their
causes, as well as on possible solutions to such conflicts.
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2.2.4 Monitoring, control and surveillance (7.7.3)
(i) The successful implementation of policy is dependent, inter alia, on the
effectiveness of monitoring, control and surveillance.  Aspects related to this are
discussed particularly in Section 4.3.3 and Fishing operations.  FAO Technical
Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries.   No.1.  Rome, FAO.  1996.  26p.  These
provide comprehensive information on the requirements for monitoring, control
and surveillance of fishing operations, with particular emphasis on larger vessels.
(ii) In setting fisheries policy, the previous records of success and failure in
monitoring, control and surveillance in the fisheries of the region, State or local
area are important in evaluating the likelihood of success of the approaches
proposed in any new policy.
(iii) The costs of monitoring, control and surveillance to a fisheries
management authority can be substantial and need to be considered in setting
policy.  In some cases, the value of the fishery to the users or society may not be
sufficient to justify the costs of a proposed monitoring, control and surveillance
system and cheaper alternatives may need to be developed.  Only approaches
which are feasible with the personnel and facilities available to an agency should
be considered.  Implementing a management plan which cannot be enforced will
damage the credibility of an authority, with repercussions possibly spreading to
other fisheries.
(iv) Generally fishers and other interest groups will only support legislation
and regulations which they consider legitimate.  In setting policy, it is important
to consult with all recognized interest groups, and to secure their cooperation and
participation, to ensure such legitimacy.  In addition, the management system
should attempt, where possible, to provide appropriate incentives for compliance
as well as penalties for non-compliance.
2.3 Data Requirements and Use in the Formulation of
Management Plans
(i) The formulation of a fisheries management plan is discussed in detail in
Section 4.1.  A fisheries management plan is an explicit arrangement between a
fishery management authority and the recognized interested parties.  It should
identify these parties and clarify their respective roles, rights and responsibilities.
 It should list the objectives agreed on for the fishery and the harvesting strategy,
rules and regulations applied to realize those objectives.  It should also describe
the mechanisms for on-going consultations, the arrangements to ensure
compliance and any other information relevant to the management of the fishery.
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(ii) The formulation of a management plan should include iterative
consultation between the management authority or authorities and the user
groups.  Stock assessment and modelling approaches, where feasible and
appropriate, should be used to investigate the biological, social and economic
implications of different harvesting strategies and management options, and the
results used to assist in the selection of the most appropriate plan.  A summary of
data and information essential or desirable in the formulation of management
plans is provided in Table 2.
2.3.1 The target stock, or stocks, and its environment
(I) The potential yield from a stock or community is dependent not only on
the biological characteristics of the stock and on the environment, but also on the
harvesting strategy used, in particular the age structure and species and sex
composition of catches, and the timing of fishing in relation to maturity and
spawning.  These characteristics of the catch can also affect the social and
economic benefits derived from the fishery.  For example, smaller animals may
command a higher price per unit mass than larger animals in some markets while
in others, the opposite situation may apply.
(ii) In the formulation of management plans, the management authority, with
the participation of the interest groups, should investigate and provide
information on the biological, social and economic implications of different
harvesting strategies and management options.  For biological assessments, data
will be required on historical catch and effort in the fishery, the size composition
of the catch (translated into age composition, if possible) and the sex and sexual
maturity characteristics of the catches.
(iii) While it is sometimes possible to undertake reliable stock assessments
using fisheries information alone, independent estimates, or indices, of stock
biomass with time generally provide very useful supplementary data on stocks. 
Where the value of the fisheries being managed justifies it, management
authorities should attempt to collect, annually or biennially, fishery-independent
estimates of stock biomass or abundance.
(iv) Stocks and ecological communities are influenced by other stocks and
ecological communities with which they interact, and changes in their population
structure induced by fishing can, in turn, influence these interacting stocks or
communities.  Where possible, information should be collected, even if only
qualitative, on the nature and strength of such relationships to allow the implications
of different management plans on non-target species or communities to be evaluated.
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Basic data for this would normally include information on trophic interactions
through studies on diets of interacting species and on the relative abundances of
interacting species.
(v) Information on environments critical in the life history of the stocks or
communities should be considered in the development of management plans,
particularly for inland waters’ species or for marine species where one or more
life stage occurs inshore.  This will enable consideration, and inclusion, of the
possible impacts of other uses of these environments or habitats in the
management plan.  
2.3.2 Fishery characteristics
(I) Generally, management plans are developed on fisheries which already
exist and may have existed for many decades.  The fishery on any given stock
may be simple, consisting of a single, relatively homogenous fleet, or may be
complex, consisting of several different fleet types ranging from, for example,
sophisticated factory ships to fleets of artisanal vessels, each fleet using distinct
gear with distinct selectivity patterns or fishing different fishing grounds.  A
management plan needs to consider each of these fleets in terms of their impact
on the resources and, in turn, the impact of a management plan on them.
(ii) This requires that data and information be collected and analysed on each
fleet such as:   the number of vessels or units; their gear characteristics and the
selectivity of the gear; any seasonality in fishing; the locality of fishing in
relation to the distribution of the stock and other fleets; any navigational or
technological aids which assist in fishing; and related factors.
(iii) Systems for sampling landings need to be designed to ensure that the
weight of landings and the biological characteristics of the catch, as well as
effort, are accurately determined for each fleet.  Where there is reason to suspect
that discarding of unwanted portions of the catch occurs before landings are
recorded, the quantity, species composition and biological characteristics of the
discarded portion should be estimated.  Observers during fishing operations, or
simulated commercial fishing with chartered commercial vessels, are generally
the most reliable means of obtaining these estimates.
2.3.3 Social and economic information
This section should be read in conjunction with the information provided in Section
2.2.3, as there is considerable overlap in the data requirements at the level of policy
and of the formulation of the management plan.  The details provided in these
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sections should not be taken to be encouraging major involvement of the
management authority in the commercial operations of the various interest
groups.  In most cases, these interest groups will be in possession of the best
information on the economic details and trends necessary for successful
operation of their fishery interests.  Under such circumstances, the role of the
fishery management authority will be more to provide advice where necessary
and to consider, or facilitate consideration of, issues of common interest between
different fisheries interest groups, and between fisheries interest groups and
others whose activities interact with the fisheries.  This may frequently require
capabilities in multi-criteria decision-making and conflict resolution (see
Sections 4.1 and 4.2).
(I) Fisheries may also be aggregated into production units, which may not
coincide with the interest groups.  For example, a production unit may consist of
a boat with its associated crew, a single net such as a seine net and those required
to operate it or a factory and its management and labour.  The impacts of
management decisions must be considered in terms of production units as well as
in terms of the interest groups.  It is therefore essential to identify the types and
number of production units in a fishery and to consider the impacts of production
units on the fishery and the impacts of management decisions on production
units in formulating a management plan.  Fishing effort is normally a function of
production units and management actions may involve direct action on these
units, either altering the number or influencing their mode of operation.
(ii) Interest groups will generally be heterogeneous in structure, and management
action may have a different impact on one sub-group within an interest group than on
another.  For example, the role of women in an artisanal fishery will frequently be
different from that of the men.  Children may also have a distinct function.  Decision-
makers, particularly at community level, may be dominated by older men.
Information on these differences needs to be collected and analysed to enable
evaluation of the impacts of a management plan on all the distinct sub-groups within
an interest group.  Failure to do this may result in the failure of a management plan
because of unexpected social or economic consequences.
(iii) The information necessary to forecast the economic impact of fisheries
management actions needs to be collected and analysed for use in the formulation of a
management plan.  Any action is likely to have different economic implications for
the different interest groups, sub-groups and on the fishery as a whole, and these
implications need to be estimated and considered.  The economic importance of
fisheries involves not only people and transactions related to the capture and
processing of the fish but also, more generally, the dynamics of investments and
markets, and this broader importance must also be considered.  For example, in
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remote coastal areas whole towns or villages may be ultimately dependent on
fisheries and hence affected by fisheries management decisions and plans.
(iv) Economic factors which need to be taken into account for each interest
group, and their sub-groups, include:
benefits, which can include rent earned from sale of the fish at different stages
in its capture and processing;
benefits other than financial, such as opportunities for bartering and factors
related to social status;
costs, including costs such as those associated with harvesting (fuel, repairs,
crew remuneration, depreciation of capital, insurance etc.), costs associated
with processing (capital depreciation, fuel, electrical power and water,
packaging, wages etc.), foreign exchange costs and opportunity costs (the
“loss” incurred by not using the money invested in the fishery in some other
way, such as simply investing it in an interest-bearing account).
taxes paid as a result of the fishery and, conversely, subsidies paid into the
fishery.
(v) The contribution of the fishery to employment should be quantified. 
Fisheries management decisions frequently have an impact on formal or informal
employment, and the impact of a specific decision, or plan, on this should be
considered.  Labour in fisheries is frequently seasonal in nature and this should
also be explicitly considered.  For example, management decisions that ignore
the seasonality of fish or labour availability are likely to fail.
(vi) It is important in the formulation of a management plan to have
information on the existing institutional structures pertinent to that fishery
(7.4.5).  This requires that information is available on:
the formal and informal institutions involved in the fisheries and their
composition and functions;
the leadership of different interest groups;
the decision-making process within the different interest groups; and
the management mechanisms relating to the fishery at all levels. 
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Again, this information should be used to assist in ensuring that the opinions and
interests of all groups and sub-groups are genuinely considered in the
management plan and that the probable impacts on and responses of these groups
and sub-groups have been considered and appropriately covered within the plan.
 Failure to do this will increase the risks of failure of the management plan to
achieve its objectives, or result in inappropriate objectives being selected.
(vii) Where there are appropriate institutions in existence, such as traditional
structures, these should be used as a part of the fisheries management system. 
For example, if a community has an accepted and functional system for
determining access to a fishery or regulating fishing seasons, this should be
incorporated into the fisheries management plan to facilitate both acceptability
and implementation. However, care needs to be taken that the institution is
appropriate for the function or functions being delegated to it.  Institutions which
have a customary role may not be appropriate for other non-customary functions
and their decisions and actions may not be accepted by the community if they are
beyond the normal jurisdiction of the institution.  Information is therefore
required on the customary roles of existing institutions and on roles which can
successfully be transferred to them.
(viii) Finally, social, economic and institutional factors are dynamic and are
subject to change.  Cultural and political factors may also lead to changes in
access distribution or changes in pressures for access.  Changes in the market,
whether local or international, may result in substantial shifts in fishing
behaviour or strategies.  All of these may mean that the objectives initially
identified for a management plan become rapidly obsolete.  Therefore, trends in
such important factors need to be described and the information on their
implications for a management approach or plan collected and evaluated.  Failure
to do this may result in a management plan becoming unworkable in a short
space of time.
2.3.4 Monitoring, control and surveillance
(i) Monitoring, control and surveillance of fisheries is critical to their
successful management, and the widespread failure of fisheries management on a
global scale has, in large part, been a result of the inability of regional
authorities, States or local authorities to enforce successfully or otherwise ensure
compliance with their management regulations and to monitor accurately the
behaviour and performance of the fishers.  Responsible fishing requires effective
monitoring, control and surveillance, which is dependent on the collection,
collation and analysis of accurate and relevant data and information.
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(ii) Because of the importance of monitoring and control, the implications for
it of alternative management plans must be seriously considered by management
authorities in selecting the most appropriate plan.  Management plans should not
be adopted where their implementation cannot be adequately monitored and
controlled.  Some examples are listed here.
The use of total allowable catch as a control mechanism requires that all
landings must be monitored and catch by species recorded in close to real
time, and adequate steps must be taken to prevent discarding of less valuable
or unwanted catch or the unregistered transfer of this at sea.  This approach
requires substantial monitoring and information processing capacity.
The use of effort control is generally less expensive. It requires, however,
accurate fleet registration and close monitoring of fleet performance and of
technical or operational developments which could increase fishing efficiency
and thus effectively increase effort (e.g. 7.6.2).
Use of closed areas or closed seasons requires the capacity to patrol during off
seasons or in closed areas to ensure infringements do not occur.
The most appropriate combination of control measures will depend on the nature
of the resource, the fishery and the capacity of the management authority.
2.4 Data Requirements and Use in the Determination of
Management Actions and Monitoring Performance
(i) An integral part of a management plan should be a management
procedure.  A management procedure specifies how management actions should
be determined and implemented, by describing which data should be collected,
how they should be analysed and exactly what management action should be
taken according to the results of the analyses.  Management actions and the
means by which they may be adjusted for changing circumstances, such as
biomass fluctuations, should be determined by pre-negotiated management
procedures.  The specific actions can then be implemented by the management
authority without the need for additional consultation and negotiation.  A
management procedure may also include contingency plans, also reviewed in
advance with interested parties, enabling the management authority to undertake
speedy and effective action in cases where the stock falls to levels requiring
emergency action.  If circumstances change before a review of the management
plan is due, to the point where the management plan and procedure need to be
revised, the requirements become those of 2.3.
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(ii) Except under exceptional circumstances of either very high catch or very
low biomass, valid and scientifically defensible estimates of the risk to a stock
induced by a particular fishing strategy can only be obtained by looking at
projections over the medium to long term, typically ten years or more.  Such
studies should underlie the development of management plans and their
associated management procedures.  It is not possible to estimate reliably the
impact on a stock or community in the medium to long-term of a single ad hoc
decision on allowable catch or effort.  Therefore, management decisions should
be made on the basis of a pre-negotiated management plan and procedure, the
impact of which has been tested over a suitably long projection period.
(iii) The data required to implement a management plan, usually based on
monitoring a stock or fish community and the fishery, are shown in Table 3.
2.4.1 The target stock, or stocks, and its environment
(I) Invariably, an estimate or index of stock size will be required for the
adjustment, typically annually, of those control measures included within a
management plan.  If the management procedure includes a requirement that
there should be an annual or seasonal adjustment to, for example, the TAC, total
effort, length of a closed season or other measure to regulate fishing mortality,
this adjustment will almost certainly need to be made on the basis of the best
estimate of the status of the stock.  Hence the management authority must ensure
that it collects, collates and analyses the data necessary to determine as precisely
and accurately as possible this index or estimate, in time for the decision to be
made.  Probably the most commonly used index of abundance is a mean
commercial CPUE figure for the period under review for the fishery or for a
representative sub-section of the fleet.  The precision of such an index should be
commensurate with the risk involved and the possibility of an over-estimation of
stock size should be covered under the precautionary approach.
(ii) The spatial distribution of living aquatic resources is dynamic, changing
seasonally and sometimes markedly from year to year.  Changes in distribution can
cause changes in catchability by the fishery or by survey gear.  These could be
interpreted as changes in abundance, leading to incorrect decisions on management
action being taken. Therefore, CPUE data should not be used alone without some
additional information on geographic distribution and trends in stock distribution. The
best approaches to this are not well defined, but a relatively simple approach that can
be taken to incorporating geographic trends is to stratify the area or areas in which a
stock is fished into sub-areas, and to analyse each sub-area separately.  This will
enable evaluation of the CPUE, or survey index, in a variety of localities
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and thus increase the probability of picking up changes in CPUE in parts of the
range brought about by changes in distribution.
(iii) As with data for the development of a management plan, if the value of
the fishery can justify it, a valid fisheries-independent estimate of stock
abundance provides extremely useful supplementary information.  For fisheries
which are highly dependent on recruiting age-classes (such as most short-lived
species), a survey directed on pre-recruits may be most useful.  Surveys should
use standard fishing techniques which must remain constant, or be calibrated to
each other, for valid estimates of trends or changes in stock abundance to be
made from one survey to the next.  Experience has shown that it is frequently
difficult to avoid changes in fishing technique, and care must be taken in
interpreting data where this is suspected to have occurred.
(iv) The Code of Conduct calls for emergency action in the event of natural
phenomena having substantial actual or potential negative impact on living
aquatic resources (7.5.5).  Therefore, at least rudimentary information on the
status of the key environmental parameters, such as sea surface temperature,
climatic conditions (such as wind strength and direction, rainfall, river outflows,
etc.) should be routinely collected and analysed to assist in the detection of
abnormal phenomena and their influence on the stock which may require
particular management measures.  Other factors which could be considered
include, for example, the water level or seasonal flow patterns in inland waters,
changing chlorophyll abundance and distribution, unusual seasonality, oxygen
concentrations in low oxygen areas, and the status of key predators and prey on
the stocks.  Remote sensing has a potentially important role to play in this area.
2.4.2 Fishery characteristics
(i) The nature of the fishery, and the fleets comprising it, here considered to
be not only discrete groups of vessels but also of land-based fishers (see
Definitions), should have been considered in the development of the
management plan.  In implementation of the management plan, as with the
resources, the role of information on fishery characteristics would be limited to
those types of data required by the management procedure to support control
decisions.
(ii) The most common use of fishery-related data in implementation of a
management procedure is in the use of effort statistics to facilitate estimates of catch-
per-unit-effort (CPUE).  Again, the method of collection and analysis of catch and
effort data should be carefully specified in the management plan.  This would
normally involve obtaining estimates of the total catch per fleet comprising the
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fishery and of the total fishing effort, in appropriate units, exerted by each fleet.
These would then be interpreted collectively to provide an index of stock
abundance, taking note of the considerations discussed under 2.4.1.  It may also
be possible to use representative sub-sets of a specified fleet component for these
calculations where data for the whole fleet are not available.  Care must also be
taken in this connection in deciding on vessel categories by size, gear type and
fishing behaviour.  In special cases, for example where one or more fleets are
fishing on the same age component of the stock in the same area and with gears
of equivalent selectivity, it may be possible to use the data from only one of the
fleets for assessment of an abundance index.
(iii) The characteristics and behaviour of the fleet should be monitored to
facilitate correct interpretation of CPUE trends.  Any changes in fishing grounds,
seasonal distribution of effort, gear type or other factors which could influence
efficiency of the fishery need to be considered in interpretation of the catch and
effort data.
2.4.3 Social and economic information
(I) In general, the social and economic features of the fishery should have
been considered early in the development of the management plan, and the
agreed needs and preferences of the various interest groups should have been
incorporated into it.  Hence, implementation of the pre-negotiated management
plan should be in the best interests of the different interest groups, including
important sub-groups within the groups.  Therefore, social and economic
considerations would not normally be a major input into the management
procedure used to determine annual or seasonal control measures.
(ii) Nevertheless, social and economic forces and dynamics can influence the
fishery, inter alia giving rise to changes in the behaviour of the fishers (see Section
2.3.3).  For example, changes in market preference for size could result in changes in
the fishing strategy of the fishery and resulting in changes in CPUE which are
independent of stock abundance.  On-going liaison with the different interest groups,
and monitoring of appropriate social and economic indicators to detect such changes,
should be carried out.  Where necessary such changes will need to be reflected in the
calculations or implementation of the management procedure.
(iii) The management plan should include explicit statement of objectives and
these will normally include social and economic objectives.  The degree to which the
management plan is succeeding in attaining such objectives should be monitored
continually and the reasons for and implications of any marked failures in achieving
objectives evaluated.  Serious failures in performance of a management plan could
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lead to a decrease in compliance with its provisions or strong pressure to revise
the plan without waiting for the scheduled routine review.  However, it must be
accepted that the natural variability in fish abundance and productivity means
that social and economic benefits are likely to be similarly variable from year to
year.  Therefore, performance of a management plan must be evaluated over a
number of years and not abandoned whenever returns fall below the expected
average return.
(iv) Notwithstanding the existence of a pre-negotiated and agreed management
plan, experience has shown that the interest groups will tend to try and depart from
the management plan when it results in decisions that they perceive are not in their
immediate best interests, for example if it leads to substantial declines in TAC.  In
such cases, social and economic arguments are normally used to support a requested
departure from the management plan.  The management authority should be in
possession of the data and information necessary to evaluate these claims of social or
economic hardship and, therefore, to be able to weigh them up objectively against
negative impacts such as an increased risk to the stock.  In general, for the reasons
given in 2.4 above, departures from a management plan should only be considered in
exceptional circumstances.
2.4.4 Monitoring, control and surveillance
(I) Monitoring involves the collection, measurement and analysis of data and
information on fishing activities and is therefore largely covered in the preceding
sections.  In addition to collecting the data necessary for implementation of a
management plan (see Section 2.4), fisheries management authorities must
ensure that they are collecting on a regular and continuous basis the data
necessary for the next revision of that plan (see Section 2.3).
(ii) Control refers to specifying the terms and conditions under which
resources can be harvested and surveillance involves checking and supervising
fishing activities to ensure all applicable laws and regulations are being observed
by the participants in the fishery.
(iii) Monitoring, control and surveillance needs and approaches will vary
substantially from fishery to fishery and even fleet to fleet.  For example, the
approaches are likely to be very different for small-scale artisanal fisheries
fishing in diverse, tropical ecosystems and large-scale industrial fisheries
utilizing essentially single stocks.
(iv) Monitoring, control and surveillance require a knowledge of the details of the
fishers, the gear they are using, and the port or ports of registry and landing.  Such
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information could, for example, be obtained from a comprehensive frame survey
undertaken every two to three years.
(v) Thereafter, at the simplest level, acquiring the data required for
monitoring, control and surveillance may involve simply collecting catch and
effort information at landing points and encouraging fishers to report any
infringements in regulations they observe.  However, at the other end of the
spectrum, monitoring, control and surveillance may involve the use of dedicated
patrol craft and aircraft supported by effective administrative and legal structures.
 In this case, operations of surface craft and aircraft used for this purpose should
be closely coordinated, and patrols should be based on an historical
understanding of fishery or fleet operations.
3. MANAGEMENT MEASURES AND APPROACHES
(i) As stated in 1.4, the only mechanism available to maintain the biomass and
productivity of a resource at a desirable level, at least in wild capture fisheries, is
controlling fishing mortality by regulating the amount of fish caught, when they are
caught and the size and age at which they are caught.  In regulating fishing mortality
there are a number of approaches which can be used, and each one will have different
implications and different efficiencies for regulating fishing mortality, impact on
fishers, feasibility of monitoring, control and surveillance and other facets of fisheries
management.  The major options are presented in the following sections.
(ii) In inland fisheries, particularly in rivers and smaller water bodies, it is
frequently possible to intensify or enhance fisheries production.  This can be achieved
by, for example, appropriate and responsible stocking of a water body with
supplementary animals of species already present, supplementary fertilization to
enhance primary or secondary production without changing ecosystems and
biodiversity and elimination of predatory or pest species.  These represent steps in a
progression from wild, capture fisheries to simple-culture-based fisheries.  The
principles and approaches to intensification or enhancement of inland fisheries are not
discussed further in these Guidelines, but will be addressed in the guidance
documentation on fisheries enhancement and aquaculture development.
(iii) In those cases where a stock is fished in areas falling under the
jurisdiction of more than one management authority, such as with transboundary
or highly migratory stocks, efforts should be made to ensure that management
measures are compatible between the different jurisdictions.  Failure to observe
this may prevent any of the management authorities, or users, from achieving
their objectives (7.3.2).
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(iv)  The total amount or mass of fish caught in a fixed period will depend on the
concentration of fish in the fishing area, the amount of fishing effort employed
during the period and the fishing efficiency of the gear used.  This relationship
indicates that there are a number of approaches which can be used to regulate the
total catch, and hence the fishing mortality imposed on a stock.
Technical measures, which are restrictions or constraints to regulate the output
which can be obtained from a specified amount of effort, for example gear
restrictions, closed seasons and closed areas.  In terms of the above regulations,
these measures generally attempt to influence the efficiency of the fishing gear.
Input controls directly regulate the amount of effort which can be put into a
fishery.  In general, inputs are more easily monitored than outputs.
Output controls directly regulate the catch which can be taken from a fishery  and
can be seen as an attempt to circumvent the problems associated with defining and
enforcing appropriate technical measures and effort regulations by directly limiting
the factor of primary concern:  the total catch.  However, catch controls also have
problems, largely associated with monitoring and surveillance.
In most instances, fisheries are regulated by a combination of more than one of
the above types of control measures.
(v) An overriding consideration, whichever combination of management
measures is used, is the decision as to whether access to the resources will be open or
limited (see Section 3.2).  The concept presented in 1.4 and 1.5.2 that excess effort
and fleet capacity should be avoided in a fishery, coupled with the fact that fisheries
resources are generally overfished because fishing capacity is in excess of that
required in the long-term, implies that a limitation on total effort with access to a
fishery may have to be imposed, while ensuring equity in the process.
3.1 Options to Regulate Fishing
3.1.1 Technical measures
(I) Gear restrictions affect the type, characteristics, and operation of a fishing 
gear.  Some gears have been prohibited outright to (i) avoid increases in fishing
capacity through increased efficiency, (ii) avoid some unwanted impact on non-
commercial sizes, species or critical  habitats, or, very often, (iii) avoid  an  injection
of new technology which could modify significantly the existing distribution of
exploitation rights (particularly when these involve new participants).  Regulation
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of gear characteristics such as minimum mesh size or dimensions of mouth
opening of nets or traps is generally introduced to control fishing mortality on
some particular component of the resource, such as smaller individuals, for
example juveniles of the target species or fish of by-catch species.  Gear
restrictions may also be designed to reduce the total catch by reducing the
potential efficiency of the fisher.  For example, prohibition on SCUBA gear in
some fisheries for sessile bottom dwelling species has this effect.  Gear
restrictions have an important role to play in making optimal use of a stock or a
resource.  However, experience has shown that gear restrictions cannot be used
alone to ensure sustainability.  In addition, impediments to improved efficiency
often increase the cost of fishing relative to other fleets and hence may lead to an
increased pressure for higher catches to maintain income levels.
(ii) Gear restrictions tend to be species-specific and, for example, a mesh-size
designated to capture mature individuals of a smaller species will still catch
immature individuals of a co-occurring larger species.  The use of subsidiary
devices such as by-catch reduction devices (BRDs), turtle excluder devices
(TEDs) and grids can be an integral part of responsible fisheries management
where, for example, by-catches of over-exploited or threatened species are
occurring or fishing is having a negative impact on aquatic communities, and
should be utilized by fisheries management authorities as necessary (7.2.2g)).
(iii) Area and time restrictions can be used to protect a component of a stock
or community such as spawning adults or juvenile stages.  As with gear
restrictions, they have an important role to play but, unlike gear restrictions, can
be used to regulate total fishing mortality on a resource.  However, a fisheries
management authority would have to monitor available effort and specify
appropriate closed areas or seasons such that the effort expended in the open
windows did not exceed the sustainable levels for the resource or that restrictions
in some time-space windows do not simply lead to transfer of excess levels of
effort to other areas in excess of that which was desirable.  These measures are
subject to the same social and economic problems in open access systems as all
other control measures.
(iv) Marine protected areas can have a critical role to play in sustainable fishing. 
Particularly for territorial species or those with relatively stationary life styles, marine
protected areas can be used to preserve spawner biomass above the thresholds (based
on biological reference points) necessary to ensure sustained recruitment.  Marine
protected areas can also play an important role in preserving critical habitats or
sensitive life stages of species.  Fisheries management authorities need to ensure that
the location and extent of marine protected areas are based on
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clearly stipulated objectives, are appropriate for meeting them and are adequately
monitored and controlled.
(v) In addition to their role in conserving the resources, area and time
restrictions can be used to reduce or eliminate conflict between different
components of the fishery system (e.g. artisanal, industrial, and foreign fleets) or
between them and other users.  By partitioning fishers or other interest groups
into appropriate time or space slots according to the nature of their use or fishing
practice, encounters between them can be reduced, thus also reducing the
likelihood of conflict (7.6.5). Such partition leads, however, to implicit
allocations, and conflicts may arise if such allocations are not considered
equitable by some users.
(vi) Both gear specifications and area and time restrictions can lead to economic
inefficiency and distortions, as they may effectively reduce CPUE below otherwise
attainable levels.  These measures therefore need to be used as part of an overall
strategy developed in consultation with the interest groups.  Good scientific
information arising from appropriate stock assessment and social and economic
studies and projections should be used to guide the choice of technical measures as
part of an overall study.  Biological reference points, for example in yield-per-recruit
analysis, should be considered explicitly where appropriate.
(vii) Minimum size and maturity restrictions can also be used to reduce fishing
mortality on life stages of stocks which are considered to require special
protection.  Where implementation of these regulations (such as on minimum
allowable size at landing) requires returning captured individuals to the water,
the management authority should determine the survival of returned individuals
to ascertain the efficacy of these measures.
3.1.2 Input (effort) control
(I) Input controls can include restrictions on the number of fishing units
through limiting the number of licenses or permits issued, restrictions on the
amount of time units can spend fishing, such as individual effort quotas, and
restrictions on the size of vessels and/or gear.
(ii) Placing an appropriate limit on effort and therefore on fishing mortality is seen
as being very important in responsible fisheries and has been discussed under
Sections 1.4. and 1.5  Some degree of effort limitation by the management authority is
a pre-requisite for responsible fisheries, whatever other control measures are in place. 
Experience has shown that in the absence of a limit on fleet capacity (and mechanisms
to stabilize it and compensate for technological progress), the amount
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of effort expended by industry cannot be effectively controlled.  However, where
secure and appropriate access rights are in position, the holders of the rights will tend
to regulate their inputs (in terms of capacity and effort) to appropriate levels in their
own economic interests.  Excess capacity is, in general, associated with open access
fisheries and tends to diminish once exclusive rights are well established.
(iii) The greatest problems in using input controls alone to regulate fisheries are
associated with problems of determining how much effort is actually represented by
each fishing unit.  Even discrete fleets within a fishery are characterized by
considerable variation in the size of vessel (where vessels are involved), the nature of
gear and technical and technological aids used, quality of maintenance of vessel and
gear, skipper skills and strategies and other factors.  These differences make assessing
the effective effort exerted in a fishery very difficult.
(iv) In theory, if sufficient data are available, it is possible to determine the
relative efficiency of each vessel and fleet by comparing historical catches per
unit of effort in a fleet data base.  In practice, however, scarcity of data and
continual change, often associated with efficiency increases, make such
calibrations difficult. This emphasizes the importance to the management
authority of the collection of appropriate data on catch and effort (see Sections
2.3.2 and 2.4.2).  Undertaking experiments, particularly over short time and
space scales, to compare gear efficiency in cooperation with industry can assist
in comparisons of effort units.
(v) If the problems of defining effort, determining the amount of effort
appropriate to a given resource and monitoring changes in effective effort can be
overcome, there are several advantages to this approach compared to regulation
by output control, particularly at a coarse or primary level of control.  Effort
control may also be desirable to avoid the problems of excess capacity, even
where output controls are in place. 
Input control is easier and less costly to monitor and enforce than output
control, particularly in mixed species fisheries where many output controls
(i.e. species-specific quotas) may be required to control fishing effort.
Associated with the above, mis-reporting of catch is not a serious factor in
input control, as there is little or no incentive for the fisher to provide incorrect
catch statistics.
In multi-species fisheries there should be less serious problems of discarding
and high-grading as, again, fishers are not regulated on the amount of by-catch
landed or reported.
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3.1.3 Output (catch) control
(I) Output control is a popular management measure for fisheries,
particularly for large-scale fisheries, and there is an even greater interest in
extending its application, in association with limited entry, with the current wide-
spread interest in individual transferable quotas (ITQs).
(ii) Output or catch control, in theory, allows estimation and implementation
of the optimal catch to be taken from a stock by a given harvesting strategy. 
Given good information on the dynamics of the stock and its response to fishing
mortality, the correct catch can, in theory, be estimated to achieve the desired
objectives.  Catch controls usually involve setting a total allowable catch (TAC)
which is then sub-divided into individual quotas by fishing nation (in the case of
international fisheries), fleet, fishing company, or fishermen (e.g. in the case of
individual quotas).
(iii) In theory, catch control eliminates the need, for control purposes, of
estimating the fishing efficiency of all units in the fishery, and of monitoring and
responding to changes in fishing efficiency with time, which are features of effort
control.  However, such assessments will remain necessary, from time to time, to
facilitate adjustment of the overall fleet capacity to take into account
technological improvements.  Without such adjustments, unregulated increases
in capacity will increase the incentives for excess fishing and mis-reporting.
(iv) Catch control also has problems in its implementation.
While catch control may protect the resource, in the absence of limited entry
and individual quotas, it does not reduce the social and economic distortions
brought about by competing fishers racing to obtain the greatest possible share
of the TAC before it is filled.
Arguably, the greatest problem associated with output control is monitoring the
outputs, the catches.  The incentive on fishers to mis-report their catches is high
when this is the factor used to regulate their own right to fish.  Therefore, the
management authority has to monitor closely catch per user and in total, to ensure
the TAC, and individual quotas where issued, are not exceeded.  This leads to the
need for a comprehensive, accurate and hence costly monitoring system that
collects and analyses data in close to real-time for effective management.
TACs and individual quotas are normally set and issued for single stocks.  In multi-
species fisheries this leads to the problem of discards and high-grading, as
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TACs and quotas for co-occurring species will be filled at differing rates.  If
fishers have completed their quota or TAC of a given species but continue
fishing for other species, they will be left with little choice but to discard or
land illegally catches of the species for which the quota is completed.  Again,
this leads to the need for an effective, and usually expensive, monitoring,
control and surveillance system attached to the management authority to
regulate fishing.  Arrangements for quota swapping and carry-over of quota or
catch from one year to the next may alleviate this problem to some extent. 
3.1.4 Some general considerations
(i)  From the preceding discussion in 3.1, it should be apparent that different
methods of control of fishing have different effects, advantages and
disadvantages that will make them more or less suitable under different
conditions.  There is no single correct approach to controlling fishing, and
fisheries management authorities will have to select the option or, more usually,
combination of options, which best suits the nature of the fishery and the
objectives of the interest groups (7.6.4).
(ii) In addition to those considerations which have a direct bearing on the
target resource and on the interest groups, fisheries management authorities must
be aware of the indirect impacts of fishing and must take steps and select
approaches that minimize harmful effects such as waste, discards, catch by lost
or abandoned gear, catch of non-target species (by-catch) and other negative
impacts on species associated with or dependent on the target species.  Particular
care must be taken where the affected organisms include endangered species
(7.6.9).
(iii) Stock recovery is an obligation under the Code (e.g 6.3; 7.2.1; 7.2.2e);
7.5.5) once there is information suggesting that stock size is at or approaching
levels where reproduction may become seriously threatened. At this point, an
explicit recovery plan may be called for, during which the attainment of optimal
yields defined by other objectives will have to be secondary in order that the
stock recovery period is not prolonged indefinitely.  Such a recovery plan
requires, of course, definition of limit reference points for the overfished or
depleted state, a means for monitoring recovery, a recovery trajectory to aim for
and a transition to optimal yield fishing strategy once completed.  The
advantages of using unusually favourable recruitment to hasten recovery rather
than to provide 'windfall yield' should be emphasized.
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3.2 Limiting Access
3.2.1 Problems associated with open access
(I) World-wide experiences with fisheries and other free-range resources
have shown that open access systems, where anyone who wishes to has a right to
exploit the resource, can have severe consequences.  In the absence of control,
open access systems will invariably lead to over-exploited resources and
declining returns for all participants.  This has been found to occur in virtually all
fisheries under open access, from small-scale artisanal fisheries to large-scale
industrial fisheries whether national or international, and has been dubbed the
“Tragedy of the Commons”.
(ii) Where there is control of overall exploitation by, for example, an overall
TAC, or a limitation on total effort by regulating the length of the closed season,
the resource may be protected but serious social and economic distortions
commonly still arise.  Generally, open access systems are characterized by a race
to fish in which all participants strive to catch as much of the resource, with or
without regulation, as they can, before their competitors do so.
(iii) Under overall regulation, this race to fish leads to features such as shortened
fishing seasons, poor product quality and sporadic availability, excess harvesting and
processing capacity and increased costs and related negative social and economic
effects. Typically, the  very high long-term costs of this situation have been borne by
society in terms of subsidies, unemployment schemes, rehabilitation of industries
following collapses, subsidies to encourage excess fleet deployment abroad, etc.
(iv) The above considerations have been to a large part responsible for the
current world status of fisheries consisting of a high proportion of over-exploited
stocks and a generally low (and often negative) profitability.  Limited access is
widely considered to be essential for efficient and responsible fisheries. 
Associated with various forms of use rights (and property rights), it has become
the norm in most systems regulating utilization of terrestrial resources.
3.2.2 Considerations in limiting access
(I) Use rights regimes can be classified into four basic types:
open access;
state-regulated access and use; 
communally-regulated access and use;
private property.
53-  -
In practice, in most access rights systems within national fisheries jurisdiction
the State retains ownership (state property) of the resource, although in inland
fisheries there is a considerable degree of private ownership.  Where the State
does retain ownership, under certain conditions this may involve payments for
granting some form of access or exploitation right to users or access to limited
numbers of individual fishers, fishing companies, fishing co-operatives,
traditional communities or other identifiable user or user-groups.  It should not
be assumed, when commencing to regulate a previously unregulated fishery, that
traditional access rights have not yet been assigned, and determining the
evidence of such traditional rights is essential.
(ii) Despite the range of possibilities in implementing systems of access
rights, there are some general principles which are related to granting access. 
There are four primary considerations in considering the nature of access rights
for limited access:  the nature of the recipients; the initial method of allocation;
whether or not the rights should be transferable; and the duration of the allocated
right.    These are discussed in the following four paragraphs, essentially in terms
of the granting of a right of access, but not ownership, by the State or authority
delegated with responsibility by the State.
(iii) The State, regional authority or local authority may allocate an access
right to a community, individual or company, or a vessel.  In general, the
allocation of access rights to a community is done to serve social or political
goals such as provision of employment or income, or to maintain human
populations in remote areas, although there are no reasons why a community
may not prove to be as economically efficient as a private enterprise.  Allocation
of access rights to individuals or companies, if associated with transferability, is
likely to generate higher economic efficiency, although this may be associated
with a loss of employment opportunities as economic rationalization is
undertaken and may displace ownership from coastal communities.  One aim in
the allocation of fishing rights to vessels can be to maintain employment
opportunities since the quota is associated with the vessel; this prevents fleet
reduction for the purposes of economic rationalization but would therefore
hinder the reduction of over-capacity where this is a problem.
(iv) Where a State or management authority is moving from a system of open
access to one of limited access, the greatest problem is almost certainly in determining
which of the previous users should be granted access and which denied access. 
Approaches to this problem can include a lottery which avoids possible problems of
favouritism or unfair decisions but makes no allowance for ensuring that the most
responsible and effective users are allowed to continue fishing.  An
54-  -
alternative approach is to sell or auction the access rights.  Where economic efficiency
is the primary goal of the fishery and where considerations of equity are not at issue
this may be an appropriate approach.  However, if the fishery is made up of people
from a wide range of economic standings, this approach will clearly favour the most
wealthy.  Finally, access can be granted on the basis of a selection of specific criteria,
including, for example, a proven history of participation in the fishery, performance,
e.g. catch above certain minimum criteria, a history of responsible fishing, of social
responsibility, etc.  In all cases, equity in allocating rights requires that all current
fishers be involved in the process.  Particular attention should be given to those with
long-standing traditions of fishing, especially, where appropriate, to indigenous
people and to those local communities highly dependent on fisheries for their
livelihoods (7.6.6).
(v) The issue of whether or not rights should be transferable is also important
and has implications for responsible fishing.  The first reaction of governments,
when seeking to restrict situations of open access, has frequently been to
establish non-transferable rights, but experience has shown problems associated
with this approach.  In general, transferable rights encourage evolution of the
fishery (including a change of actors and a rejuvenation of the sector).  They also
lead to greater economic efficiency as they allow the more efficient fishers to
accumulate greater access through the market.  They also provide a mechanism
for new entrants into the fishery which, under limited access without
transferability, is problematic.  The disadvantages of transferability are that it can
lead to the formation of monopolies.  Where social goals are important, such as
the provision of employment to communities, transferability can negate progress
towards achieving these goals.  As with many other disadvantages associated
with access rights, legal provisions to avoid or minimize them may be possible.
(vi) The final consideration presented here is that of the duration of rights to be
granted.  In general terms, the advantage of granting access rights is that they
encourage a sense of ownership in the user, which should lead to a greater sense of
long-term responsibility to the resources and fishery, leading to more responsible
fishing.  This is particularly true if the user can transfer the rights (to a resource to
which he or she has contributed to improvements) to his or her descendants or
capitalize on such improvements upon retirement.  These facets are encouraged by a
longer duration of the right so that the user is aware that he or she will gain the
benefits for responsible action or pay the price for negative actions with regard,
particularly, to the health of the resource.  Long-term rights also make it easier for
holders to gain financing for their ventures.  However, particularly in the absence of
transferability, long-term rights prevent the introduction of new entrants and mean that
poor initial decisions on allocation may be difficult to reverse.  Overall though,
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assigning long-term rights within a system of limited access is generally the
preferred option for responsible fishing.
(vii) Clearly, as with control of fishing, it is possible to develop a system of
access rights which best meets the specific objectives, including macro-political
and macro-economic objectives, for the fishery in question.  The final system for
a given fishery should be carefully negotiated with likely applicants and derived,
as far as possible, by consensus.  However carefully the system is designed, it
should be anticipated that there will be disputes, and a method of fair appeal
should be catered for.  Nevertheless, the ultimate advantages to the users, the
resources and the State, of a limited access system rather than an open access
system will more than justify the difficulties of striving for the former.
3.3  Management in Partnership
(i) Responsible fisheries management implies attempting to accommodate
the interests of a wide range of parties who often represent competing, or even
conflicting, interests.  It also implies the recognition that the efficiency and
implementability of the management measures are often highly dependent on the
support gained from the interested parties. In many situations it will be necessary
to rely on various collaborative arrangements or mechanisms between States and
interested parties as an alternative to locating the entire set of management
responsibilities totally within government structures (see Section 1.6).  However,
ultimate responsibility for decision-making regarding rules and management
measures usually remains with the management authority.
(ii) Management in partnership encompasses the various arrangements which
formally recognize the sharing of fisheries management responsibility and
accountability between a fisheries management authority and institutions either
public, such as local level government, or private, such as a group of interested
parties.  Hence, management in partnership is likely to carry with it a decentralized
and unstandardized nature.  It often reflects a concern for efficiency and equity at the
State or management authority level, coupled with proven capacity for self-
governance, self-regulation and active participation at the level of the interested
parties concerned.  The decision to implement approaches for management in
partnership and the extent of self-management delegated to the interested parties
should be based on both the characteristics of the fishery concerned and the capacity
of the decentralised or local institutions to handle the authority delegated.  There may
also be a need for the fisheries management authority to provide assistance, including
administrative support, to the delegated partners.
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(iii) In the context of international fisheries, where the interested parties are
primarily the member States of an intergovernmental fisheries management
institution, the extent to which the management authority may further devolve or
share its decision-making power and responsibilities to other groups of interested
parties is likely to be more limited.  However, various form of arrangements
allowing a certain degree of management in partnership may be desirable.  It may
be, for example, in the interests of responsible fisheries that industry advisors
attend meetings of management authorities (7.1.6).  Other forms of partnership
apply to some arrangements involving a small number of States in the
management of a delimited fishery, such as some international lakes or for
shared stocks within a bay or a small gulf.
(iv) Arrangements for management in partnership may be particularly
valuable in small-scale fisheries, where the management authority is unable to
provide cost-effective service.  Management in partnership may also be
requested by the interest groups when they are paying for the cost of
management.  Such arrangements encompass a wide range of possible degrees of
intervention by the State.  On one extreme, such an arrangement may simply
formally recognize an existing system of fisheries management at local level,
such as a traditional or customary system, and involve no further intervention or
support from the State.  At the other extreme, the delegation of authority under
the partnership arrangement may require full support from the State in the form
of financial and logistic support for the process from the formulation to the
implementation and monitoring of the management plan.  Within this range,
various sets of responsibilities, accountabilities and functions could be devolved,
including, for example, selecting appropriate management measures, assigning
or registering of fishing rights, and the enforcement of local fishing regulations.
(v) Within the fisheries management planning process, the management
authority should identify and consider the situations for which management by
some form of partnership is likely to be an effective and sustainable policy
option.  In doing so, care must be taken to evaluate case by case which type of
partnership arrangement is likely to yield the desired long-term returns.  This
decision should be based on criteria such as the potential for:
greater reliability and accuracy of data and information;
more suitable and effective regulations;




strengthened commitment to and participation by concerned interested parties.
(vi) However, consideration must also be given to the difficulties which are
frequently encountered with management in partnership, particularly at the early
stage.  Attention will need to be given to, for example:
higher requirements for institutional change or adjustment than those for
purely State control;
probable increase in transaction costs as a result of longer negotiation
processes;
higher risk to the resources if resource users are not properly organized or do
not have the necessary capacity;
probable diminished administrative support for implementation; and
risks of greater political or lobbying interference at the local level.
(vii) As a complex endeavour, establishing and implementing partnership
arrangements should, as for other management processes, follow a structured
approach involving research, consultation, decision-making and institutional
reform. Approaches should be flexible to fit specific situations, countries,
fisheries and fishing communities.  They should also allow for gradual
implementation, possibly driven by the accumulation of formal knowledge by
the responsible interest groups on the relevant social, economic and
environmental issues.
(viii) For fisheries to be managed at local level, an effective legal instrument
will be required to define clearly the respective role and functions of the local
authority and management groups concerned (e.g cooperative, user committee,
traditional community).  This instrument should also clearly demarcate the
physical territory or fisheries management unit over which the management
group will exercise its management functions.  This territory should, as far as
possible, coincide with the existing realm of activity of the group concerned.
(ix) Within the management group, it is also important to ensure that the
conditions for membership are explicit and that they reflect, as appropriate, the
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social and economic cohesion of the group.  Whenever possible, the
management group should not be so large as to unduly hinder consultation and
decision-making.
(x) Mechanisms should also be established to verify from time to time that
the social and economic benefits derived from utilizing a partnership scheme
equal or exceed the costs of investing in related activities and that those costs are
equitably supported by the participants in the management scheme.  Such
mechanisms could be part of a wider coordinating arrangement with
representation by the interest groups concerned and representatives of the
management authority to monitor the partnership arrangement, assist in resolving
conflict and establish rules.
4. THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS
4.1 Formulating Management Plans to Reflect Selected Objectives
and Constraints
(I) A fisheries management plan is a formal or informal arrangement between
a fishery management authority and interested parties which identifies the
partners in the fishery and their respective roles, details the agreed objectives for
the fishery and specifies the management rules and regulations which apply to it
and provides other details about the fishery which are relevant to the task of the
management authority (see Section 1.6.2).  The relationship between the
management plan and the fisheries policy and objectives is discussed in Section
1.7.
(ii) It is suggested that management plans reflecting the management
objectives should be drawn-up for all fisheries (7.3.3). These management plans
will then serve as a reference and information source for the management
authority and all interest groups, summarizing the current state of knowledge on
the resource, its environment and the fishery, and reflecting all the decisions and
actions agreed upon during the course of consultations between the management
authority and the interest groups. Ensuring plans are developed and implemented
for all fisheries helps to avoid planned management measures on one fishery
creating unforeseen problems and externalities in a neighbouring fishery for
which no plan is available (see Section 1.5.2).
(iii) The considerations which would normally be included in a management
plan are indicated in Table 4.  The details of the data required for the formulation
of a management plan are discussed in Section 2.3.
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4.2 Identifying and Agreeing on Objectives for the Fishery
4.2.1 The need for consultation with recognized interest groups
(I) In most fisheries, governments have the primary responsibility and
accountability for making decisions in relation to fisheries management. 
However, such decisions should be preceded by a number of processes, the
details of which will vary according to the nature of the fishery.
(ii) It is essential that the decisions made on objectives and management
measures for a fishery should reflect the best scientific information available
(7.4.1).  The amount of information will vary according to the nature of the
fishery and the capacity of the management authority.  However, in all cases,
every reasonable effort should be made to have sufficient information to make
informed decisions which reflect the probable productivity of the resource and
the nature of its environment. Failure to do this will substantially increase the
risks of biological, social and economic damage, unless the precautionary
approach is invoked.  Wherever the information (or the precision of the advice)
is deemed insufficient, a precautionary approach should be adopted (see Section
1.8).
(iii) The utilization of living aquatic resources and the management of this
utilization should be seen as partnerships between the management authority and
the interest groups (see Section 3.3).  The objectives should reflect the reasonable
desires of the interest groups, within the constraints imposed by the biological
and ecological limitations of the resources and the overriding objectives of
national planning.  Therefore, consultation and joint decision-making are
essential in determining the objectives.
(iv) Many reasonable objectives will be mutually incompatible (see Section 1.5). 
For example, maximizing average yield from a fishery is incompatible with
minimizing biological risk to the resource or minimizing impact on other stocks, such
as those predators also dependent on the resource.  Similarly, maximizing the
economic returns from a fishery may be incompatible with maximizing employment
opportunities.  Therefore, interest groups will frequently have opposing objectives. In
order to achieve maximum compliance and cooperation from all parties, it is
important to arrive at a compromise which will at least be accepted, if not without
reservation, by all or most of the interest groups.  This will require open and
transparent decision-making (7.1.9) and close consultation with all recognized interest
groups and the application of effective decision-making procedures and approaches.
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(v) The interest groups may include non-fishery groups and, in the case of
coastal and inland fisheries, frequently will include such groups.  Where a
fishery is substantially impacted by external environmental factors, it is
important to reflect this and to include interest groups or authorities responsible
for the external factors in the management plan.  There are four possible
scenarios to be considered within the time frame of the management plan:
further changes in the external factors are likely which will further modify the
fishery ecosystem;
further changes are likely but will not markedly affect the fishery;
external influences on the fishery will diminish;
the situation is likely to remain stable.
Different management responses will be required depending on which of these
scenarios is believed to be correct.  Liaison with the external interest groups is
important to:  identify the most likely scenario; through discussion to avoid
undesirable changes or promote favourable changes; estimate the most desirable
management options within the macro-economic context of the region, State or
local area; or to negotiate compensation to adversely affected interest groups.
4.2.2 Determining the appropriate management measures
(i) A variety of management measures is available to fisheries managers, and
each of them will have different implications for the resource and for the
objectives set for the fishery (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2).  The most appropriate set
of management measures should therefore be selected to facilitate achieving
these objectives.  This will require careful consideration of the effects and
implications of the measures referred to in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
(ii) In evaluating management measures, it is necessary to consider their
implications for the biological, ecological, economic and social objectives of the
fishery under consideration (7.2.1; 7.2.2; 7.2.3).
(iii) Any fishery exists within a broader ecological, economic and social
context (see Sections 1.5 and 2.2).  Failure to recognize this and to adopt
management measures which are consistent with the policies, objectives and
management approaches of the broader geo-political zone could result in failure,
or reduced efficiency of the fisheries management strategy, or conflict between
different users (7.2.3).
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(iv) Similarly, management measures need to reflect the macro-economic
policy for, for example, the catchment area, river basin, coastal zone, local area
or State (see Section 1.5.2).
(v) There is seldom a single correct set of management measures that should
be applied to a fishery; rather, there are trade-offs between desirable, less-
desirable or undesirable effects.  The most appropriate set of management
measures is that which maximises the desirable effects and minimizes the
undesirable effects for a particular fishery and the objectives set for it.  It is
therefore necessary, for responsible fisheries, to investigate the costs (in the
broader sense) and the benefits of different sets of management measures to
identify those most appropriate for the fishery  (7.4.3; 7.6.7).
(vi) An important consideration in the implementation of a management plan
is that any controls or constraints on the fishers or other interested parties should
be implementable by the management authority.  This requires that the
management measures are feasible and that the management authority and
interest groups have the capacity to put them into effect.  For example,
management by catch quotas will almost certainly fail if the management
authority does not have the human and financial resources to monitor catches, or
the use of closed areas will not work if the authority is unable to patrol the areas
and prevent illegal activities within them.  Therefore, the implications for
monitoring, control and surveillance of the management measures being
considered should be taken into account.
(vii) As with setting objectives, the management measures in operation form a
part of the social contract or arrangement between the management authority and
the interested parties.  Consideration and selection of the set of measures for a
given fishery should be undertaken openly and transparently and with full
participation by all recognised interest groups.  Failure to observe this
recommendation could lead to non-compliance by all or some interested parties. 
The deliberations and final decisions should again be taken on the basis of the
best available scientific information, including information on the biological,
economic and social implications.
4.2.3 Reviewing the management plan
The status of the resource, the circumstances and priorities of the interest groups and
the national circumstances and priorities of any geo-political zone change with time. 
This means that management objectives and measures can also become obsolete or
inappropriate with time.  For this reason, a regular evaluation should be undertaken of
the effectiveness and efficiency of the management plan, normally every three to
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five years with revisions made as necessary (7.6.8).  Such revisions should be
undertaken with all the normal pre-requisites for decision-making discussed in
this document.
4.3 Implementation
4.3.1 Effective legal and institutional framework (7.1.1; 7.7.1)
(i) Within the context of these Guidelines, the term “legislation” is used in
the broadest sense, encompassing all types of national and local laws and
regulations.  What follows here is intended to provide general guidance only and
much will depend on whether the country in question has a civil law, common
law, or other legal system, and whether or not it is a federal system. The term
“legal regime” covers, as appropriate, these as well as international legal
instruments.  The relevant provisions of any legal regime which relate to the
management of a fishery essentially guarantee that the rules, i.e. the general
terms and conditions under which the fishery should be managed and the
mechanisms that regulate conflicts, enjoy the force of law.  Those provisions are
usually framed, revised or amended to reflect the agreed fisheries management
policy.  The relevant segments of any  fisheries management legal regime should
not depart from reflecting the desired medium- to long-term management
objectives for that fishery.
(ii) From a formal standpoint, at national level the primary legislation
(typically a Fisheries Act) is usually approved by the Legislature (e.g. Congress,
Parliament). It is generally broad in scope and typically lays down principles and
policies (see Section 1.7).  It may also reflect varying degrees of detail of
implementation, such as the main features of a specific mechanism (e.g. that
controlling the allocation of fishing rights).  Legislation adopted by the
Government through a delegated law-making authority generally sets out the
substantive and procedural details of implementation of the provisions of the
primary legislation.  These are usually referred to as regulations (which may
consist of rules, orders, decrees or by-laws).
(iii) Responsible fisheries management requires that the primary fisheries
legislation should, as far as possible, not be subject to frequent changes.  It should
include reference to establishing fishery management plans and some indications of
the modalities of the planning process.  The primary legislation should therefore
define the institutional structure for fisheries management and should empower this
structure with the corresponding authority.  Hence, in order to implement successfully
fisheries management decisions, legal clarity is essential as to who is entitled to
administer and control the use of the fisheries resources.
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(iv) At national level, the above paragraph implies that the primary fisheries
legislation should spell out precisely the functions, powers and responsibilities of
government or other institutions involved in fisheries management, including the
delimitation of their jurisdiction.  Ideally, the legal regime should provide the
basis for one or more fisheries management authorities to formulate, monitor and
implement fisheries management plans, including the necessary powers to
formulate appropriate management measures and enforce the related fisheries
regulations. Where more than one management authority exists, overlapping
jurisdictions should be avoided as far as possible.
(v) In specifying jurisdiction, it is necessary to define the policy-making
entity, the geographical area the policy covers, the interested parties likely to be
bound by the policy, the institutions respectively responsible for implementing
and for enforcing the management plan, and how inter-institution jurisdictional
disputes will be resolved.  Failure to do so will inevitably lead to overlap and
conflicts both between sectoral management institutions and between different
tiers of government, all claiming jurisdiction in respect of common matters. 
Consideration should also be given, as appropriate, to reducing administrative
inefficiencies and duplications. More generally, any assessment of a fisheries
management structure should emphasize the relationship between the
characteristics of the institutional system and its likely effectiveness.
(vi) Routine management control measures (e.g. closed seasons, size limits,
permissible effort) which may need frequent revision should be spelt out in
subordinate legislation, such as regulations, which are, or should be, fairly easily
changed to reflect changes in fisheries management needs.  A similarly flexible
approach could be applied to other matters of procedure. In many cases, keeping
regulations simple with a clear connection to the relevant management issue and
ensuring that procedures for implementation are fair and transparent, are likely to
encourage compliance by interested parties.
(vii) The management authority should continually monitor the suitability and
cost effectiveness of fisheries regulations and evaluate them in detail when
modifying management plans for specific fisheries (7.6.7). Those provisions
which appear to be obsolete or not enforceable should be amended as required.
Further, the laws and regulations implemented should be readily enforceable, and
the jurisdictional and administrative procedures supporting enforcement should
be fair and transparent (7.1.9).  Failure to consider properly these issues is likely
to undermine the credibility and acceptability of the overall fisheries legal regime
and the level of compliance.
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(viii) All relevant international legal instruments, and in particular the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1995 UN Convention on Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, should be taken into
consideration when preparing or amending fisheries management legal regimes.
When relevant, and particularly with regard to inland fisheries, full use should be
made of the provisions which exist in international instruments or arrangements
providing mechanisms for integrated management of fisheries resources at river
basin level. The coastal and riverine zones are usually covered by several
overlapping maritime, water, forestry or other legal regimes.  The fisheries
legislation should be in harmony with the general body of legal instruments
covering these activities.  Particular attention should be given to other legal
regimes in the context of integrated coastal area management, either at domestic
or international levels.
(ix) Where the management policy includes some form of formal partnership
arrangement with one or more interested party, potentially useful principles
rooted in traditional practice could provide valuable guidance to national
legislators and should not be overlooked (7.6.6).
(x) Appropriately widespread consultation should be undertaken with the
interested parties during  the process of formulating or amending legal provisions
relating to fisheries management  (see Section 4.2.1).  Such collaboration should
ideally be accompanied by acceptance by interested parties of their obligations with
respect to management measures. Failure by the interested parties or their
representatives to abide by the regulations set by the authority must lead to penalties
which should be set at a level to be effective deterrents (7.7.2).  Such deterrents should
include, where appropriate, the loss of the right to participate in the fishery.
(xi) In order to encourage compliance it is important for the management
authority to ensure that the laws and regulations are distributed to all interested
parties and, where necessary, adequate attention given to ensuring they are fully
understood (7.1.10). 
(xii) Another important function of any fisheries legal regime is to establish the
institutional arrangements and procedures necessary to reduce potential conflicts and
facilitate their resolution when they occur. When disputes do occur, allowance should
be made for recourse to formal procedures and a transparent dispute settlement
process.  These could include hearings and, as appropriate, the setting of
compensation.  However, in view of the social and economic nature of most conflicts
related to fisheries management, attention may frequently need to be given to
achieving a balance of interests when resolving conflict, rather than attempting to
identify a correct and an incorrect party. When the authority for managing a
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fishery is devolved to local or community levels, an instrument of agreement
should ideally be negotiated prior to the devolution, by which interested parties
accept binding dispute settlement, where necessary, by a third party agreed upon
between themselves and the management authority.
4.3.2 Effective administrative structure (7.7.1)
(I) The preceding sections have indicated that fisheries management requires
the capacity to:
collect, collate and analyse information on the status of the stocks, the nature
of catches and landings and the nature of the fishery;
collect, collate and evaluate information on the economic and social
importance and impact of the fishery;
in conjunction with other relevant authorities, consider the impact of the
fishery on the management of the geo-political zone (e.g. coastal, catchment,
economic grouping) as a whole, and the impacts of other activities in this zone
on fisheries;
liaise, discuss and make joint-decisions with all groups interested in the fishery;
facilitate the formulation of policy relating to the fishery;
coordinate the formulation of management objectives and management
measures, taking cognizance of the preceding factors listed above;
review the objectives and management measures on a regular basis;
implement the measures, requiring monitoring, control and surveillance of the
fishery.
(ii) The above tasks clearly require adequate capacity and facilities, which
will require adequate financing.  The Code of Conduct suggests that, where
appropriate, efforts should be made to recover the costs of fisheries management,
including conservation and research, from the interest groups who are deriving
benefits (7.7.4).
(iii) In determining the scope of the above activities, the management authority
should bear in mind the value of the fishery to the State, sub-region or region, and
develop management approaches which are consistent with this (see Section 1.5.2).
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Where the management authority is dealing with trans-boundary or highly-
migratory stocks, the States and regional or sub-regional bodies should
determine between them how the activities will be funded.
(iv) In addition to recommendations included under Article 7, the
requirements relating to research by the management authority are listed in the
Code under Article 12.  This article recommends that States should establish a
suitable institutional framework to identify applied research requirements (12.2)
and should ensure that research undertaken meets internationally accepted
scientific standards (12.6).  Article 12 lists the following areas where research is
required:
biology, ecology and environmental science related to the fisheries (12.1);
fisheries technology, including gear selectivity, environmental and biological
impacts of gear (12.1; 12.10; 12.11);
aquaculture (12.1);
economics and social science (12.1; 12.9);
nutritional science (12.1);
role of fish and fisheries as sources of human food (12.7 and 12.8);
health aspects of fish as food (12.8).
(v) Most of these research activities are an integral part of ensuring that fisheries
management decisions are based on the “best scientific information available” (and
possible), and these activities are integral to resource monitoring and assessment. 
Therefore, the development of appropriate research capacity and on-going collection,
collation and analysis of fisheries and fishery resource data and research results is
critical to the implementation of responsible fisheries management.
(vi) It has widely come to be recognized that effective, sustainable fisheries are
only possible if there is close cooperation and mutual acceptance between the interest
groups, probably dominated by fisheries interests, and the management authority.  It
has also become evident that the debate between interest groups is made easier when
all such groups have a really significant interest in the matter to be debated i.e.
something valuable to lose. The authority is responsible for ensuring that only
significantly interested parties are allowed to participate in the consultation and that
this consultation takes place and leads, as far as is possible, to consensus and
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optimal decisions.  This will require the establishment of the necessary structures
and responsibilities within the management authority to:
identify the valid interest groups;
set up discussion and joint decision-making bodies, with clearly defined
responsibilities relating to setting objectives and formulation of management
plans, with appeal procedures and with formal communication channels, and
to ensure that they meet on a regular basis;
ensure adequate dissemination of research results, fisheries statistics, fishery
plans, other rules and regulations and other material important to ensuring all
interest groups are fully informed on the fishery and its management, and
hence in a position to fulfil their responsibilities;
publish and disseminate annual reports of the fisheries management authority.
4.3.3 Effective monitoring control and surveillance (7.7.3).
(I) The purpose of a monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) system is to
ensure that fishery policy in general and the conservation and management
arrangements for a specific fishery are implemented fully and expeditiously (7.1.7).
(ii) There is no unique solution to the design and implementation of MCS
systems.  While they are based on common principles and goals (see e.g. Sections
2.2.4; 2.3.4; 2.4.4), they need to be modified and tailored to the characteristics and
needs of each specific fishery, varying substantially, for example, from artisanal to
industrial and from concentrated to dispersed.  Fisheries that characteristically have
very mobile fleets targeting highly migratory species of fish will require sub-regional
or regional co-operation in conservation and management and hence also in MCS.
Such cooperation should include measures to deter the activity of vessels flying the
flag of non members or non participants in established organizations or arrangements
from engaging in activities undermining the effectiveness of the agreed management
measures (7.7.5).
(iii) A range of separate or inter-linked activities of varying degrees of
sophistication can be implemented as part of an MCS system.  Some of these
activities are simple and inexpensive, involving, for example, collection of catch and
effort information at landing points, exchange of data for the same fleets if they are
operating in adjacent EEZs and encouraging fishers to report infringements.  At the
other end of the spectrum are costly and sophisticated activities involving dedicated
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MCS vessels and support aircraft (see Fishing operations.  FAO Technical
Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries.   No.1.  Rome, FAO.  1996.  26p.). 
Transponders, providing cost-effective and immediate information on vessel
location and activities, are already being used for MCS in some fisheries and
their application is likely to increase rapidly.
(iv) It can be anticipated that the need for surveillance to ensure compliance
with regulations will diminish with greater participation in the management
process by fishers and other interest groups.  With greater shared responsibility,
individual fishers and others will tend to infringe regulations less frequently and
will also assume greater responsibility for surveillance themselves, reducing the
responsibility to be borne by the overall management authority.
(v) MCS in small-scale fisheries presents a range of unique problems which relate
to large numbers of widely dispersed fishers operating within a fishery.  An important
approach to MCS in such fisheries is, where possible, to foster a strong local
awareness of and identity with the need for conservation and management.  Through
community-based rights of access to resources and other communally-agreed
management measures, effective cooperative MCS systems can be developed.
(vi) In industrial fisheries, authorized fishers need to be provided with incentives to
elicit voluntary compliance with fishery policy and agreed management plans and
management measures, in order to reduce the operational requirements and costs of
MCS.  To achieve this objective, action must be taken, where not already done, to
convert fishers from open-access status to legitimate holders of access in a controlled
and restricted fishery.  In this way a sense of part-ownership of, and hence
responsibility for, the resource can be developed in fishers (see Section 3.2).
(vii) Notwithstanding the above, it is unlikely that the need for surveillance, or at
least coordination of surveillance, by a management authority will ever disappear
completely.  A distinction should be made here between the need for consultation
with fishers before developing regulations and subsequent enforcement which should
be complete, impartial and not subject to 'special intervention'.  Thus, in the event that
violations do occur, there must be provision for swift, impartial and appropriate
enforcement action to deter fishers from further violations of the agreed management
and control measures, including, where appropriate, the loss of fishing rights.
(viii) Because fishers are the primary beneficiaries of MCS programmes, the
practice in some countries has been that they bear some, if not all, of the costs of
MCS.  Where a decision is made to implement this approach, it should be introduced
incrementally, and the fishing industry required to assume progressively
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higher shares of MCS costs.  Clearly, this type of measure will be most
acceptable and effective if fishers are involved in the management process from
policy through to decisions on MCS and enforcement strategy.
(ix) It should also be recognized that not only does an effective and well
planned MCS system enhance fisheries conservation and management but
should also lead to improved safety for vessels and crew and permits the real-
time transfer of market information which can be beneficial to the fishing
industry as a whole.  This consideration has proved to be a significant one in
some industrial fisheries in developed States.
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DEFINITION OF SOME KEY TERMS
Biological diversity or biodiversity means the variability among living organisms from
all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic
ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes
diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems.  Diversity indices
are measures of richness (the number of species in a system); and to some
extent, evenness (variances of species' local abundance). They are therefore
indifferent to species substitutions which may, however, reflect ecosystem
stresses (such as those due to high fishing intensity).
Biological resources include genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof,
populations or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or
potential use of value for humanity.
Discards are those components of a fish stock (see below) thrown back after
capture. Normally, most of the discards can be assumed not to survive.
Exploitation rate, applied on a fish stock, is the proportion of the numbers or
biomass removed by fishing. If the biomass is 1000 tons and the harvest
during a year is 200 tons, the annual exploitation rate is 20%. See also
fishing mortality.
Fisheries management authority is the legal entity which has been assigned by a
State or States with a mandate to perform certain specified fisheries
management functions.
Fisheries management organizations or arrangements are international
institutions or treaty arrangements between two or more States that are
responsible for fisheries management, including the formulation of the
rules that govern fishing activities. The fishery management organization,
and its subsidiary bodies, may also be responsible for all ancillary
services, such as the collection of information, its analysis, stock
assessment, monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS), consultation
with interested parties, application and/or determination of the rules of
access to the fishery, and resource allocation.
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Fishery can refer to the sum of all fishing activities on a given resource, for example a
hake fishery or shrimp fishery.  It may also refer to the activities of a single
type or style of fishing on a particular resource, for example a beach seine
fishery or trawl fishery.  The term is used in both senses in this document and,
where necessary, its particular application is specified.
  
Fishing capacity is a concept which has not yet been rigorously defined, and there are
substantial differences of opinion as to how it should be defined and estimated.
 However, a working definition is the quantity of fish that can be taken by a
fishing unit, for example an individual, community, vessel or fleet, assuming
that there is no limitation on the yield from the stock.
 
Fishing effort represents the amount of fishing gear of a specific type used on
the fishing grounds over a given unit of time e.g. hours trawled per day,
number of hooks set per day or number of hauls of a beach seine per day.
Fishing mortality is a technical term which refers to the proportion of the fish
available being removed by fishing in a small unit of time.  Fishing
mortality can be translated into a yearly exploitation rate (see above)
expressed as a percentage, using a mathematical formula.
Fish stock or fish resource means the living resources in the community or
population from which catches are taken in a fishery.  Use of the term fish
stock usually implies that the particular population is more or less isolated
from other stocks of the same species and hence self-sustaining.  In a
particular fishery, the fish stock may be one or several species of fish but
here it is also intended to include commercial invertebrates and plants.
Fleet is used broadly in this document to describe the total number of units of any
discrete type of fishing activity utilising a specific resource.  For simplicity, it
is used here to include shore-based activities. Hence, for example, a fleet may
be all the purse seine vessels in a specific sardine fishery, or all the fishers
setting nets from the shore in a tropical multispecies fishery.
Interested party or Interest group refers to any person or group recognized by the
State or States as having a legitimate interest in the conservation and
management of the resources being managed.  This term is more
encompassing than the term stakeholder.  Generally speaking, the  categories
of interested parties will often be the same for many fisheries and could
include contrasting interests: commercial/recreational, conservation/
exploitation, artisanal/industrial, fisher/buyer-processor-trader as well as
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governments (local/State/national). The general public and the consumers
could also be considered as interested parties in some circumstances.
Management objective is a target that is actively sought and provides a direction
for management action.  For example, achieving a reasonable income for
individual fishers is one possible economic objective of fisheries
management.
Recruits to a stock are the new age group of the population entering the
exploited component of the stock for the first time or young fish growing
into or otherwise entering that exploitable component.
Reference point is an estimated value derived from an agreed scientific
procedure and/or an agreed model which corresponds to a state of the
resource and/or of the fishery and can be used as a guide for fisheries
management.  Some reference points are general and applicable to many
fish stocks, others should be stock-specific.  A distinction should be made
between target reference points and limit reference points, or thresholds,
the latter representing low states of the stock to be avoided.
Species assemblage is the term used to describe the collection of species making
up any co-occurring community of organisms in a given habitat or
fishing ground.
Sustainable use means the use of components of biological diversity in a way
and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological
diversity or of any of its components, thereby maintaining their potential
to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations.
Table 1. Desirable data and information requirements for fisheries at the level of policy making, according to nature and use
of the data
Data type




Summary of recent landings
  by fishery
Summary of potential yields
  by fishery, with options of
  possible alternative
  approaches
Probable inter-annual
  variability in yield and
  any likely long-term
  trends in resource
  productivity
Details on environmental
  constraints and sensitive
  habitats
Details on the implications
  of any international
  agreements which affect   
  the fisheries
Summary of types of fishery
  and fleet and gear character-
  istics for each fleet
Number of fishing units for
  each fleet, at present
Extent and importance of
  recreational fisheries, where
  applicable
Key fishing grounds and their
  characteristics
Summary of number and
  distribution of landing sites
The impact of fishing gear and
  practices on the environment
  and on the ecosystem
Details of the costs of fishery
  management
Summary of existing user
  rights systems of each
  fishery and fleet
Major interest groups and  
  their 'stakes', including
  gender and age sub-divisions
  within each interest group
  and likely policy
  implications
Any trends influencing or
  likely to influence fisheries,
  e.g. demographic changes,
  political changes,
  migrations, etc.
Employment characteristics
  by fishery and fleet and
  possible alternative sources
  of employment
Summary of successes or
  problems in monitoring and
  control by fishery and fleet
Financial and institutional
  implications of different
  policy options for monitoring
  and control
Details of existing 
  arrangements and potential
  for partnerships or co-
  management with user or
  interest groups
Table 1 (cont'd)
Data type




Contributions to national or
  local economy by fishery
  and fleet
Existing or likely develop-
  mental activities and their
  implications for fisheries
Details of any subsidies being
  paid to fishers and
  estimated costs of reducing
  over-capacity
Characteristics of and trends
  in markets
Implications of State macro-
  economic policies which
  could influence fisheries
Details on any existing
  international agreements on
  trade, cooperation, etc.,
  which affect fisheries
Table 1 (cont'd)
Data type





  structures related to the
  fishery, including
  traditional institutions
Details on any existing or
  possible conflicts between
  fisheries or fleets,
  including the causes
Table 2. Desirable data and information requirements for fisheries for the formulation of management
plans, according to nature and use of the data.  The information required for determination of the overall
fisheries policy is also relevant to the formulation of management plans
* = Desirable but lower priority
Data type




Historical and current catch
  data (in weight or
  numbers), including
  directed and by-catch and
  discards, for fishery and
  fleets
Size and/or length
  composition of catch per
  fleet
Sex and maturity 
  composition of catch per
  fleet(*)
Age composition of catch
  per fleet(*)
Time, date and locality of
  all catches(*)
Fishery independent
  biomass estimates
Gear used by different fleets
  and knowledge of its
  selectivity
Number of fishing units (e.g.
  vessels and fishers) in each 
  fleet
Numbers and localities of
  landing sites and fishing units
  operating from or landing at
  each site
Total effort for each fleet
Relative fishing power of
  different fishing units
Area fished by each fishing
  unit
Description of the types of
  production units in the
  fishery and the number of
  each type of production unit
  per fleet
Details of user or access
  rights systems related to the
  fishery
Total number of fishers
  employed in all fisheries-
  related activities, with
  details on gender and age-
  group characteristics
Existing monitoring and
  control systems for the
  fishery and fleets within it
Known strengths and
  weaknesses of existing
  systems
Implications (personnel, costs,
  benefits, etc.) of range of
  approaches for monitoring
  and control









  assessments indicating
  potential yields and
  resource status under
  different harvesting
  strategies
Annual estimates of
  number of recruits
  entering fishery(*)
Stomach contents data for
  knowledge of trophic
  relations
Data on mass of species
  consumed per predator
  type and feeding
  preferences of
  predators(*)
Detailed characteristics on
  equipment per vessel   which
could influence   efficiency
(e.g. GPS,   echo-sounder,
etc.)(*)
Mass of catch by
  commercial size
  category(*)
Implications for each fleet
  for range of management
  approaches
Comprehensive data, per
  catch, on effort used,   exact
position, depth   fished and
other data   relevant to
characteristics   of the catch
for each   fleet(*)
Existence of, and possible
  solutions to, any conflicts
  between fisheries or fleets
Total landed value of the
  catch for each fleet and any
  other benefits
Details on processing of catch
  and on markets, as well as
  benefits derived from these
  activities
Existing or potential systems
  (institutions) and their
  potential roles in shared





  regulations, or modifi-
  cations, required for   range
of management   approaches
Table 2 (cont'd)
Data type




Time series of indices of
  environmental charac-
  teristics (e.g. sea
  surface temperature)(*)
Details on full costs of
  fishing by fleet and
  processing, marketing and
  distribution costs
Specific international trade
  or cooperation agree-
  ments relevant to fisheries
Details on socio-economic
  characteristics of national
  or local non-fishing
  activities which do or may
  impinge on the fisheries
Procedures for consultation
  and joint decision-making
Table 3. Desirable data and information requirements for fisheries for implementation of the management plan, according to nature
and use of the data.  The data and information required for the formulation of the management plan are also relevant
to the implementation of the management plan
Data type




Most recent data on indices
  used in management
  procedure 
  (e.g.commercial CPUE,
  estimated biomass, etc.)
Information on biological or
  environmental features
  which could affect
  interpretation of indices
Information on any
  unexpected event related
  to the stock (e.g. unusual
  recruitment, natural
  mortality, environmental
  conditions) which could
  warrant departure from
  management procedures
Total catch and effort data  
  for the fishery or, if
  heterogenous, per fleet
Unusual features of fishery or
  fleet behaviour which could
  influence interpretation of 
  stock indices used in the
  management procedure
Changes in fishery or fleet
  composition which could
  impact on management
  procedures
Unexpected social changes
  which could require
  departure from management
  procedure, e.g. movements,
  changes in patterns of access
Unexpected economic changes,
  e.g. in markets, returns or
  costs which could seriously
  impact the management plan
Social and economic
  performance of fisheries and
  fleets in relation to objectives
  of management plan
Name of each fisher or
  licensed fishing unit (e.g.
  vessel)
Address or port of registry of
  each vessel or fishing unit
Name and address of owner
  of each fishing vessel or
  unit
Information from each fishing
  unit necessary for enforcing
  management measures (e.g.
  catch, effort deployed, catch
  position, etc.)
Table 3 (cont'd)
Data type




Status of the stock in
  relation to trends anti-
  cipated in the management
  plan
Details on the nature and
  causes of any serious
  conflicts within the fishery
In the case of vessels:
(1) date and place built
(2) type of vessel
(3) length of vessel
(4) vessel markings
(5) type of gear
(6) international radio call sign
Incidence and causes of any
  serious and ongoing violations
  of the management plan
Table 4. Outline of possible topics in a fishery management plan
- Title
- Area of operation of the fishery and under which jurisdiction it falls
- History of fishing and management
- Particulars of the recognized groups with interests in the fishery
(interest groups)
- Details of consultations leading to formulation of the management plan
- Arrangements for on-going consultations with interest groups
- Details of decision-making process or processes, including the recognized
participants
- Objectives for the fishery:
resource (Section 1.3.1)
environmental (Section 1.3.2)




- Outline of the fishery resources including particulars of life histories as
appropriate
- Outline of fleet types or fishing categories participating in the fishery
- Outline of status of the stocks as indicated by stock assessments, including a description of the assessment methods,
standards, and stock indicators, biological limits, etc.
- Description of the aquatic ecosystem, its status and any particularly sensitive areas or features influencing or affected
by the fishery (Section 1.3.2)
- Details of non-fishery users or activities which could impact on the fishery, and arrangements for liaison and co-ordination.
This may be particularly important in inland and coastal fisheries.
Table 4 (cont'd)
- Details of those individuals or groups granted rights of access to the fishery, and particulars of the nature of those rights
(Sections 3.2 and 3.3)
- Description of the measures agreed upon for the regulation of fishing in order to meet the objectives within a specified
time-frame (Section 3.1). These may include general and specific measures, precautionary measures, contingency plans,
mechanisms for emergency decisions, etc.
- Specific constraints, e.g. details of any undesirable bycatch species, their conservation status and measures taken to reduce
this as appropriate
- Details of any critical environments or sources of concern and actions required to address them
- Particulars of arrangements and responsibilities for monitoring, control and surveillance and enforcement
- Details of any planned education and training for interest groups
- Date and nature of next review and audit of the management plan
Some of the above may be of a generic nature and hence be dealt with in the general rules of fishing (e.g. a national fishery legislation),
in which case these can be referred to in the plan, without repeating all the details.  However, specific points or detail may be
required for specific fisheries.

